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Various political and social events in our recent past, such as 
those in Nazi Germany, the civil rights movement, the assasinations of 
American leaders, campus protests and riots over the Viet Nam War and 
especially in recent governmental abuses of power, have stimulated 
interest in the issues of morality and values. In addition, threats or 
nuclear war, of dwindling natural resources, world famine, and of the 
destruction of our environment produce frightening and grim prospects 
for the future. Mutual social and political cooperation, as well as 
strong moral leadership seem essential for our survival. 
These issues and events can have implications for our whole process 
of socialization. "In its broadest and most widely accepted sense, the 
function of socialization is to enable the individual to 'fit into', and 
to form adequate relationships with other members of his group or cul-
ture" (Kelvin, 1971, p. 212). This definition stresses conformity and 
implies that conformity is a central aspect of socialization. However, 
as exemplified by Nazi Germany, socialization can effectively produce 
conformity, and still not be good. 
In addition, "a growing or dynamic group or society, as distinct 
from a static one, depends on creative individuals who innovate; perfect 
conformity is sterile, at best maintaining the status quo, at worst 
blocking adaptive change" (Kelvin, 1971, p. 217). It seems, therefore, 
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that one goal of socialization, in addition to conformity, is to enable 
the individual to achieve individuality within the basic framework of 
society. These two goals may seem incompatible. In fact, moral and 
political philosophers throughout history have discussed the problem of 
"the balance, and conflict, between the needs and rights of the individ-
ual and those of his community ••• " (Kelvin, 1971, p. 221). 
This conflict between conformity and individuality has been studied 
experimentally. Stanly Milgram (1963) demonstrated quite dramatically 
how subjects conform to an authority even in the face of violating 
another's rights. In his study the subjects were instructed to admin-
ister increasingly severe "electric shocks" to a confederate "learner" 
as he made errors in a paired-associate memory task. The majority of 
subjects complied with the demands of the experimenter to continue 
shocking the "learner" despite the confederate's loud protests. Many of 
the subjects justified their behavior in that they were obeying the 
authority, were following instructions, that they had agreed to partici-
pate in the experiment and were fulfilling an obligation. 
This high degree of conformity of experimental subjects has been a 
topic of increasing concern in the past fifteen years. Orne (1962) has 
discussed the subject's motivation to play the "good subject" role, that 
is, to behave in such a way as to validate the experimental hypothesis. 
Even when subjects are aware of the experimental deception procedures, 
they behave in accordance with the role of the good subject. For exam-
ple, when completely informed about the verbal conditioning task, sub-
jects gave performance curves which were similar to the learning curves 
of naive subjects (Levy, 1967; Lichtenstein, 1968). Moreover, when 
questioned in a post-experimental interview about the amount of 
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foreknowledge, researchers have found subjects unwilling to tell the 
truth (Golding & Lichtenstein, 1970; Levy, 1966). That is, they will 
lie to maintain the social order, or to maintain the expectation of the 
authority figure (the experimenter) that they persist in their good sub-
ject role. Thus, it has been demonstrated that subjects will behave in 
rather "immoral" ways, i.e., physically harm another or lie, when pres-
sured to conform ~o the expectations or commands of an authority figure. 
The earliest attempts to experimentally investigate various factors 
which account for moral behavior were atheoretical. The studies were 
based on the assumption that moral behavior is determined by moral 
knowledge and beliefs, implying that socialization is a result of learn-
ing the rules of society. Following these atheoretical studies, three 
major, general theories of socialization emerged to guide subsequent 
research in the area of moral development. These three viewpoints, 
psychoanalytic, learning approach and cognitive-developmental, have 
influenced the bulk of this research. Psychoanalytic theory and the 
learning approach both view man as hedonistic and the process of social-
ization as gradually modifying the ways in which man strives to satisfy 
these needs. 
On the other hand, the cognitive-developmental approach has focused 
on analyzing the basic thought structures underlying the development of 
moral concepts. The development of morality or moral thinking is "in 
large part dependent on successively emerging concepts of how people 
form mutual expectations about the coordination of their behavior" 
(Rest, 1976, p. 6). Kohlberg (1964) is one of the main advocates of the 
cognitive-developmental theory of moral development. He has conceptual-
ized moral development as a progression through three levels. At the 
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most rudimentary level (preconventional) moral development begins with 
a period of conformity or obedience as a function of physical rewards 
and punishments. As the child develops the cognitive capacity to take 
another's role, morality is conceptualized as an exchange of favors or 
as serving self-interest. At the conventional level, a more cooperative 
reciprocity, based on conformity to the other's or society's expecta-
tions then develops. This is finally followed by the ability to think 
in terms of abstract rights, that go beyond conformity to the expecta-
tions of the immediate situation. This is principled morality. This 
pattern of moral development encompasses the goal of socialization as 
facilitating individuality within the basic framework of society. The 
theory speaks to the basic conflict between individual rights (self-
interes t) and social responsibility. 
Kohlberg (1969) has pointed out that level of moral judgment has 
behavioral implications in that it leads one to differentially define 
moral obligations and duties in ambiguous situations. Kohlberg (1968) 
also reports that the majority of adults and young adults function at 
the conventional level of morality. Thus, it can be expected that a 
high degree of compliance and conformity will be found among most adult 
subjects participating in psychology experiments. However, if a group 
of subjects were known to be functioning at a higher level of moral 
development, quite different expectations regarding their willingness to 
comply and conform would prevail. The present study was designed to 
investigate the relationship between an individual's level of moral 
judgment and actual conduct. Golding and Lichtenstein (1970) found that 
subjects were unwilling to confess that a confederate had revealed the 
experimental deception procedures in a pre-experimental tip-off. In one 
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of their conditions the experimenter implicitly condoned the subject 
lying about the amount of prior information he had received. In the 
other condition the experimenter encouraged the subject to be truthful. 
Regardless of this differential encouragement to be truthful only 10-"15% 
of the subjects confessed, with no significant difference between condi-
tions. 
In the present study subjects were assigned to three levels of 
moral development as determined by a pre-test. So that no association 
would be made between the pre-test and actual experiment, subjects were 
then contacted by phone and asked to participate in an experiment having 
to do with physiological responses to sexually oriented stimuli (pat-
terned after Golding & Lichtenstein, 1970 and Valins, 1966). Following 
a preexperimental tip-off where a confederate revealed the experimental 
deception, subjects experienced a post-experimental interview that 
either condoned lying or encouraged them to tell the truth regarding 
their amount of foreknowledge. It is expected that subjects functioning 
at the principled level of morality will be most truthful regardless of 
the interview condition. The lying behavior of subjects at the conven-
tional level will be most variable. That is, they will be most i:;uscep-
tible to the demand characteristics and will conform to what they 
believe is expected of them by the experimenter. It is expected that 
subjects at the pre-conventional level will lie the most regardless of 
the differential encouragement to be truthful. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Morality is a complex phenomenon that has been a concern of philos-
ophers, religious leaders and social thinkers for centuries. The com-
plaint that "Young people are not what they were: They no longer obey 
their parents" dates back to Egypt 1,000 B.C. (Bull, 1969). Ethics, 
defined as the study of standards of conduct and moral judgment, comes 
from the Greek word "ethos," meaning character. The beginning of ethics 
as a branch of human science has been traced to Socrates but probably 
the most influential work is that of Aristotle (Rogers, 1927). In 
Nicomachean Ethics he says, "In practical matters the end is not mere 
speculative knowledge of what is to be done, but rather the doing of it. 
It is not enough to know about virtue then, but we must endeavour to 
possess it, and to use it, or to take other steps that may make us 
good." Reflecting on the divergent viewpoints regarding the development 
of morality, he goes on to say that "What makes men good is held by some 
to be nature, by others habit or training, by others instruction." 
These two quotes capture what has been the major focus of the study of 
morality within the realm of psychology from the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. In general, researchers have sought to discover the 
nature of the development of morality, as well as the relationship 
between moral knowledge, moral affect and moral behavior. 
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This review of the literature is intended to serve as an introduc-
tion to the psychological study of morality. Following an abbreviated 
historical review, three principle theoretical orientations and a sum-
mary of their related research will be discussed. The discussion will 
cover the psychoanalytic and learning theory approaches and then place 
greatest emphasis on the cognitive-developmental approach. More exten-
sive reviews and discussion of other theoretical viewpoints can be 
found (eg. Hoffman, 1970; Kohlberg, 1960; Lickona, 1976). 
Historical Review 
Initial attempts to study morality were atheoretical and most were 
based on the notion that moral behavior is determined by moral knowledge 
and beliefs. Pittel and Mendelsohn (1966), in their review of efforts 
to conceptualize and measure moral values through research, date the 
earliest general study of morality back to Osborne (1804). In seeking 
to discover the "ethical content of childrens' minds," Osborne used an 
open-ended questionnaire. He asked children to state what they must do 
to be called good or bad. He discovered that children believed conform-
ity to rules were more important than any specific categories .of acts. 
Interestingly, this finding was later supported by Piaget's (1932) 
observations of primitive morality being characterized by obedience to 
external sanctions. 
In 1898, Sharp, who was concerned with philosophical issues rather 
than normative behavior, required college students to write short essays 
justifying their responses to hypothetical moral situations. The pur-
pose of his research was to develop an objective method for studying 
moral issues. His open-ended method of responding to hypothetical moral 
situations was similar to that used by later investigators (eg. Piaget, 
1932; Kohlberg, 1968). 
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Fernald (1912), in attempting to identify delinquents by a battery 
of perceptual-motor and paper-and-pencil measures, administered two 
tests of ethical content. One test asked children to indicate whether 
they agreed or disagreed with descriptions of legal violations. The 
other test, considered to indicate moral intelligence, required subjects 
to rank how serious various offenses were. 
Pressey and Pressey 1 s (1919 "cross-out" X-0) tests of moral judg-
ment included 25 groups of 5 items each. Subjects had to cross out the 
"worst" item in a group, such as the following: dancing, drunkenness, 
flirting, overeating, smoking. 
In 1922, Kohs, who incorporated parts of Fernald 1 s test, as well as 
Pressey and Pressey's X-0 Test, developed his own Ethical Discrimina-
tions Test. Subjects had to choose the correct definition for various 
words, such as 'good' or 'enemy'. In addition, they had to decide what 
treatment (praise, nothing, scold, jail, or kill) an individual deserved 
for different behaviors such as stubbornness, perjury or shoplifting. 
A variety of other instruments designed to measure moral knowledge 
were developed in these first two decades (Brotemarkle, 1922; Lincoln 
and Shields, 1931; McGrath, 1923; Woodrow, 1926). Because of the 
accepted notion of a direct relationship between moral knowledge and 
moral behavior, it was hoped that these tests would differentiate 
between normal and delinquent individuals. · However, this relationship 
was investigated by Lowe and Shimberg (1925) using the Terman Fables 
Test, a measure of moral knowledge. These researchers tested a large 
group of delinquent and normal youths and found that the only 
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significant difference between the groups was that normal youths were of 
higher intelligence. The authors concluded that the assumption that 
moral knowledge predicts moral behavior had to be questioned. 
Thus, these early attempts to study morality began with a more 
general exploration of moral knowledge. Investigators then attempted to 
show a direct relationship between actual conduct and moral knowledge. 
As more research was conducted, the assumption that moral behavior is 
determined by moral knowledge and beliefs became increasingly doubtful. 
Probably the most monumental study of moral conduct was that of the 
Character Education Inquiry (Hartshorne & May, 1928; Hartshorne, May & 
Maller, 1929; Hartshorne, May & Shuttleworth, 1930). Working with 
school children, these investigators devised a series of instruments 
collectively known as the Tests of Moral Knowledge. For example, there 
was a vocabulary test of moral terms, an Attitudes and Opinions Test, 
which tapped attitudes toward misconduct and moral principles and duties 
and a test requiring subjects to anticipate various consequences result-
ing from certain activities, e.g., getting into a fight at school. The 
investigators used the Tests of Moral Knowledge in an attempt to predict 
actual behavior in numerous conduct tests, most of which involved some 
form of resistance to temptation geared to measure three kinds of deceit; 
cheating, lying and stealing. The Tests of Moral Knowledge did corre-
late about .70 with measures of intelligence, but the researchers found 
low correlations between their Moral Knowledge tests and their behav-
ioral measures (about .25). The authors concluded that the factors 
producing moral actions were so complex that it was impossible to make 
any generalizations at all about moral behavior or any generalizations 
about a pattern of moral development. They found moral conduct to be 
situation specific and that there was little evidence that a general 
honesty trait existed within individuals. 
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The conclusions of the Character Education Inquiry have subse-
quently been refuted and criticized. Maller (1944) demonstrated that 
individual behavior was influenced by specific factors, yet that a com-
mon factor, "delay of gratification," existed. Other researchers 
(Barbu, 1951; Brogden, 1940; Heilman, Hodgson & Hornstein, 1972; Sears, 
Rau & Albert, 1965) have found a general honesty factor or consistency 
in moral behavior across situations. Burton (1963) reanalyzed the 
original Hartshorne and May (1928) data with multivariate methods and 
discovered a single general factor of resistance to temptation. He 
agreed that certain social learning conditions could contribute to dif-
ferential degrees of generality or specificity of moral character within 
an individual. Burton (1976), in reviewing the generality-specificity 
issue, concluded that a small but consistently manifested honesty factor 
exists, yet various conditions affect actual behavior. 
In sunnnary, this abbreviated historical review has shown how 
initial attempts to study morality were atheoretical and focused on 
moral knowledge or beliefs. The assumption that moral conduct is deter-
mined by moral knowledge was not supported by the data. The findings by 
the Character Education Inquiry of no specific honesty trait were later 
refuted and it was concluded that there is a general honesty trait that 
does relate to conduct, even though other factors also affect actual 
behavior. 
Major Theoretical Viewpoints 
One result of the Character Education Inquiry conclusions was a 
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shift away from paper-and-pencil tests of moral knowledge in attempting 
to predict actual conduct. This shift was also, in part, a result of 
Piaget's 1932 publication, The Moral Judgment of the Child. Whereas 
previous research had been atheoretical, focusing on the content of 
moral knowledge, thoughts and beliefs, Piaget's new methods of assess-
ment were more concerned with the influence of intellectual development 
on the processes of moral thought. In addition, the impact of the 
psychoanalytic and behavioristic models of personality development was 
being felt, each of which in turn generated separate lines of research 
in the area of moral development. Thus, there have been three main 
theoretical viewpoints, psychoanalytic theory, learning theory and 
cognitive-developmental theory, which have influenced the bulk of 
research and thinking about moral learning and development (Graham, 
1972; Hoffman, 1970). Each of the three main theoretical approaches 
defines morality somewhat differently and has a distinct focus in terms 
of research, as well as characteristic methods of assessment. 
Psychoanalytic Approach 
In general, psychoanalytic theory takes a hedonistic view of man 
which assumes that all human behavior is consciously or unconsciously 
directed towards the relief of tension or the gratification of impulses. 
The amoral child lacks the motivation to control his own behavior, thus 
adult intervention is necessary. It is believed that hostility results 
as a function of frustration engendered by the adult, yet the hostility 
is repressed due to anxiety over anticipated punishment. To maintain 
this repression as well as gain parental affection, the child develops 
a generalized motive to adopt the parental values and behaviors. Moral 
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standards are initially and largely a result of introjection, or the 
process of unthinkingly accepting values given by parents or other 
authority figures. The function of this internalization of values, or 
in Freud's term, "super-ego" development, is to keep unacceptable 
impulses from conscious awareness. This is not to say that these 
standards, once acquired, remain unchanged or unaffected.by various 
external influences throughout life. 
Psychoanalytic research has typically focused on moral development 
as a function of the parent-child relationship, including an investiga-
tion of discipline techniques and the processes of internalization or 
identification. Much of the research of this type has occurred in nat-
uralistic settings. Utilizing introspective reports, the research has 
also focused on the affective component of behavior, especially guilt 
feelings. Psychoanalytic theory postulates that guilt, an unconscious 
process, is a result of repressed impulses breaking into awareness. A 
second view suggests that guilt is a conscious experience that follows 
the violation of an internalized standard and is a self-critical reac-
tion. Projective measures of guilt are considered an index of inter-
nalization and typically consist of the subject's responses to devia-
tion, story-completion or doll-play situations (Allinsmith, 1960; 
Burton, 1971; Rabin & Goldman, 1966; Miller & Swanson, 1960). Indica-
tions of the degree of internalization have also included behavioral 
measures of resistance to temptation, considered to be a result of the 
individual's repression of the impulse to deviate (Grinder, 1960, 1962; 
MacKinnon, 1938). 
In summary, psychoanalytic research on moral development has been 
largely conducted in naturalistic settings and has looked at various 
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aspects of the parent-child relationship. This research has dealt 
mostly with the affective component of behavior (e.g., guilt). 
Researchers have utilized projective measures of guilt as well as behav-. 
ioral measures of resistance to temptation as indicative of the degree 
of internalization of morality. 
Learning Approach 
The learning approach (used loosely here to include such types as 
social learning, S-R, etc.), influenced by psychoanalytic thought, has 
taken a clearly hedonistic view of man striving to satisfy his physical 
or biological needs. In general, the learning approach regards other 
sources of satisfaction as derived from the basic needs by association. 
According to more extreme behavior theory (e.g., Gerwitz; Skinner), 
moral behavior and values, like any other behavior, are learned as a 
function of rewards and punishments usually administered by parents, 
the principle agents of socialization. Behavior is maintained or mod-
ified by this pattern of reinforcement. 
Social learning theorists (e.g., Aronfreed; Bandura & Walters; 
Sears, Maccoby & Levin) believe that reinforcement by itself cannot 
account for the acquisition of all behavior and attitudes. Thus, they 
have focused on the process of observational learning or modeling, and 
vicarious reinforcement. Internalization of conscience is believed to 
be a function of these factors, as well as the self-generation of rein-
forcing events (Graham, 1972). Aronfreed (1961) has emphasized aver-
sive training, anxiety and reduction of anxiety as the main mechanism 
of internalization. He has also emphasized cognitive processes as the 
mediators of the anxiety. Social behavior is thus influenced by such 
factors as the characteristics of the social models, the methods of 
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parental training and reinforcement contingencies, and the ability to 
make appropriate generalizations and discriminations. "To be moral is 
to conform to certain kinds of expectations of reinforcement which may 
very well be symbolically mediated by the individual himself but which 
have their ultimate origins in reinforcement from others" (Graham, 
1972, p. 98). 
The learning approach research has predominantly focused on overt 
behavior rather than moral emotion such as guilt or moral thought or 
judgment. There have been attempts to demonstrate the influence of 
modeling on moral behavior (Ross, 1971; Stein, 1967; Wolf & Cheyne, 
1972) as well as the role of imitation, observational learning and 
vicarious consequences in moral development (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; 
Cowan, Langer, Heavenrich & Nathanson, 1969; Prentice, 1972). The 
research has also focused on situational variables as they affect moral 
behavior. Moral conduct has been shown to be a function of varying 
incentive (Brodsky & Jacobson, 1970; Mill, 1958) and the risk of detec-
tion (Canning, 1956). 
In summary, the learning approach to the study of moral develop-
ment has investigated such variables as the effects of reinforcement, 
observational learning, modeling and vicarious reinforcement. In addi-
tion, characteristics of the social models as well as various situa-
tional variables have been studied. In contrast to the psychoanalytic 
or cognitive-developmental approach, the learning approach research has 
addressed itself to moral behavior instead of moral emotion or moral 
judgment. Thus, this broad theoretical line of research has relied 
most heavily on behavioral indices of morality. 
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Cognitive-developmental Approach 
The cognitive-developmental approach to morality received its main 
impetus from Jean Piaget (1932), who has provided a conceptual frame-
work for studying the development of moral thought, as well as an 
important technique for assessing moral reasoning. This viewpoint does 
.not regard the basic motivation for morality as need reduction or the 
alleviation of anxiety or fear, but instead assumes that moral behavior 
is produced by a generalized motivation for acceptance or self-esteem. 
In general, Piaget (1932) concentrated on analyzing the thought 
structures underlying a child's moral concepts. These thought struc-
tures are unified wholes rather than just a sum of ideas pertaining to 
bits of behavior. Piaget views moral development as an aspect of more 
general cognitive development. Thus, like cognitive development, moral 
development progresses through a sequence of stages. There are central 
modes of thought or concepts that characterize each stage and are 
reflected in many behaviors, thus accounting for a certain consistency 
in the various responses of the child at a particular stage. The stages 
are defined by structures of interaction between the self and others, 
rather than through the internalization of rules that were once exter-
nal. The stages differ both qualitatively and quantitatively in that 
development consists of integrating the preceeding stage as well as 
synthesizing new structures resulting from the individual's interaction 
with the social environment. 
Maturation of the child's cognitive capacities as well as the 
experience of socialization and peer interaction influence the transi-
tion from stage to stage. The environment influences moral development 
only by the general quality and extent of cognitive and social 
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stimulation. Changes in cognitive capacities coupled with new modes of 
social experience broaden the child's perspective on such things as 
authority and reciprocal role taking. The influence of the environment 
does not provide new standards and values, but rather stimulates the 
child to restructure his existing moral thought patterns. 
Another important aspect of the cognitive-developmental approach 
is that development through the stages occurs in an invariant sequence, 
the order of succession of stages is constant and universal. However, 
the age and rate at which each individual passes through the stages is 
affected by the environment and level of cognitive development. 
In his pioneering work, The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), 
Piaget proposed two broad stages of moral development: heteronomous 
morality and autonomous morality. Piaget viewed the essence of moral-
ity as consisting of the individual's respect for the rules of social 
order and his sense of justice or concern for equality and reciprocity 
between people. Briefly, this early stage of heteronomous morality or 
morality of constraint is characteristic of children up to age seven or 
eight and is a reflection of the child's egocentrism. The child views 
behaviors as totally right or wrong and the wrongness or rightness is 
determined by the magnitude of the consequences and by the extent the 
behavior conforms to established rules.· The child in the more advanced 
stage of autonomous morality, or morality of reciprocity takes a much 
more flexible view of rules, realizing that they are established and 
maintained through mutual social agreement and responsive to human 
needs. Intention replaces consequences in determining right and wrong. 
Obedience to authority, which defined duty and obligation for the heter-
onomous child, is replaced in the autonomous child by conformity to peer 
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standards and the ability to empathize. 
Piaget's method of assessment was an important contribution in 
that it provided a means to assess moral development relatively inde-
pendently of moral content. Children were presented with stories 
involving some type of transgression, but which differed according to 
motivation, intention and consequences. Questions were designed to 
determine the child's beliefs about violation of rules, types of punish-
ment, etc. The responses were classified according to stage of moral 
development, emphasizing the cognitive component of moral judgment. 
Research relating to Piaget's theory of moral development has 
generally focused on one or more of the various aspects of the theory. 
There seems to be a great deal of support for the notion of invariant 
sequence and universal age-trends, although the results are more incon-
. sistent in non-western cultures. Jahoda (1958), working with West 
African children, found the expected decrease with age in the concept 
of immanent justice and Dennis (1943) obtained identical results with 
Hopi Indians. Havighurst and Neugarten (1955) however, found contra-
dictory results working with ten American Indian groups. 
Johnson (1962) found a positive relationship between IQ and moral 
judgment maturity and a positive relationship has been found between 
formal operations and moral development (Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey, 
1972). "The relation between IQ and the moral attributes formulated by 
Piaget are consistently positive" (Hoffman, 1970, p. 271). Other 
investigators have looked at such aspects of the theory as absolutism 
of moral perspective or ego-centrism (Pinard & Laurendeau, 1970); the 
child's conception of rules as unchangeable or flexible (Epstein, 1965); 
and objective versus subjective concept of responsibility (Grinder, 
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1964; Krebs, 1965). 
Piaget's theory and examples of types of related research has been 
briefly summarized here to provide a theoretical understanding of the 
origins of more current cognitive-developmental theories of moral 
development. Piaget's use of hypothetical moral dilemmas allowed moral 
development to be separated from knowledge or specific moral content. 
The emphasis is on moral stage as a developmental characteristic rather 
than morality as a function of situational variables. 
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1963) has provided the most systematic 
and influential modification and extension of Piaget's theory of moral 
development. Accepting the basic cognitive developmental approach, 
Kohlberg agrees with Piaget that moral development proceeds through an 
invariant sequence of stages, each stage being qualitatively different 
from the preceedirig one. Piaget's conception of cognitive development 
as progressing through the Sensory-motor, Pre-operational, Concrete, 
and Formal Operational periods came later than his theory of moral 
development. Thus, Kohlberg had applied features of Piaget's subse-
quent theorizing to his model. Kohlberg's subject population, which 
included adolescents and adults, was older than Piaget's (only up to 
age 12) and his dilemmas were more complex. Therefore, he was able to 
extend Piaget's theory, discovering many new characteristics of indiv-
uals' moral thinking. 
Using the method inspired by Piaget, Kohlberg administered ten 
hypothetical moral dilemmas to 72 middle and lower class boys (ages 10, 
13, and 16) (Kohlberg, 1958). His dilemmas involved a conflict between 
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conformity to rules or authority and the humanneeds or welfare of 
others. The youths were required to choose a course of action to 
resolve the dilemma and were then asked a series of questions designed 
to determine the reasoning underlying their choices. Kohlberg, like 
Piaget, was not interested in the moral content or specific choices, 
but in determining basic cognitive .structures or modes of conceptual-
ization. 
Defining Levels of Moral Development 
On the basis of his data, Kohlberg defined six developmental types 
of value-orientations that he grouped into three moral levels. Thus 
there are two types or stages at each level, and each is characterized 
by a set of common issues, such as rules, conscience, welfare of others, 
self's welfare, duty, role taking, punitive justice, positive justice 
and motives. Each moral statement expressed by a subject was assigned 
to one of 180 cells (30 dimensions x 6 levels per dimension) and stage 
type was determined for each individual on the basis of percentage of 
statements within each· type. For example, there are six distinct .stage 
characterisations for the issues of conscience, six for welfare, and so 
on. 
Kohlberg views the three moral levels, each containing two stage 
types, as separate moral philosophies. These are described below, and 
summarized in Appendix A. Each level is associated with a distinct 
sociomoral perspective or point of view the individual takes in def in-
ing social facts and moral values or judgments. 
At the preconventional level (stages 1 & 2) the individual views 
the rules and social expectations as external to himself. Behavior is 
motivated by the avoidance of punishment, attainment rewards or 
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exchange of favors, without true understanding or upholding of societal 
rules. These individuals tend to conform to others when those others 
are powerful, coercive and in control of the rewards and punishments. 
They also have a highly individualistic perspective and tend to confuse 
their own needs with what is right and wrong. 
Conventional (stages 3 & 4) individuals uphold the rules of 
society for their own sake. Behavior is geared toward maintaining the 
expectations of others and is characterized by conformity to stereo-
typical images of what is majority behavior of by compliance to author-
ity figures. Moral obligation is conceptualized as establishing 
mutually helpful relationships, of being attuned to the expectations of 
each other. 
At the post-conventional or principled level (stages 5 & 6) there 
seems to be more of an effort to define moral values and principles 
apart from the authority of the group, and apart from the individual's 
identification with these groups. Society's rules are understood and 
accepted according to the general moral principles that underlie the 
rules, such as equality, justice and love. The individual tends to 
function more autonomously in terms of these self•chosen ethical 
principles, rather than be influenced by situational factors and con-
tingencies. 
Research-Construct Validity 
Research has typically focused on validating various aspects of 
the cognitive-developmental approach. Several longitudinal studies 
have shown that level of moral development increases with age (Kohlberg, 
1969; Kramer & Kohlberg, 1969). Kramer (1968) did find that some high 
school subjects showed a period of regression rather than progression 
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upon reaching college. This finding is not discrepant with general 
developmental theory as Kohlberg (1969) explains that within a develop-
mental framework, regression can be accounted for by certain forms of 
experience. Cross-sectional research has also demonstrated the expected 
age-related trends and older subjects have been found to use higher 
stage thinking than younger subjects (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1969). 
Turiel (1966), in attempting to experimentally induce changes in 
moral reasoning, tested the notion that the stages form an invariant 
sequence, such that an individual's current mode of thought determines 
which new concepts he can learn. A corollary .to this is that each 
stage represents a reorganization or displacement of the preceeding 
stages. Turiel found that children exposed to moral reasoning one 
stage above their own stage were able to learn and generalize more con-
cepts than subjects exposed to concepts either one stage below or two 
stages above their dominant stage. Because of the fixed sequence. of 
development, subjects were influenced more by reasoning just above their 
current level than by reasoning just below or two stages above. 
Kurtines and Grief (1974) discuss various shortcomings of this study. 
They feel that Turiel incorrectly analyzed his results, that there was 
some confounding by a memory effect, and that no subjects were at Stage 
5 or6. 
Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969), however, replicated Turiel's 
(1966) findings and thereby provided further support for the notion of 
a developmental hierarchy. They also discovered that children prefer 
concepts that are above their predominant stage to concepts that are 
below. Reasoning two stages above the predominant stage was more dif-
ficult to comprehend than either reasoning one stage above or one stage 
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below a subject's current stage. Rest (1973), in studying the patterns 
of comprehension and preference of the reasoning characteristic of each 
of the stages, became convinced that the stages constitute a hierarchy 
of logical complexity. 
To further support the notion of an invariant developmental 
sequence and that the stages are culturally universal, Kohlberg has 
conducted cross-cultural research in places as diverse as Formosa, 
Turkey, Mexico, Taiwan and Yucatan (Kohlberg, 1969). Despite the fact 
that specific norms and values differ from culture to culture, Kohlberg 
has found basic commonalities relevant to making moral judgments. The 
way in which a subject uses these general considerations determines his 
stage, and Kohlberg has found similar age trends and patterns of usage 
in these cultures. However, the universality of moral development 
stages has been criticized because of the limited number of cultures 
(twelve) researched (Simpson, 1975). In addition, Kohlberg's method of 
reporting this data (e.g., unspecified sample size and unspecified char-
acteristics of subjects and methods used to determine the stages) and 
the fact that in certain cultures individuals were absent in the 
advanced stages has led to criticism of his research (Kurtines and 
Grief, 1974). 
As further support for the cognitive-developmental approach, 
Kohlberg's 1scale has generally been found to be positively correlated 
with IQ (.30 to .50). This relationship is curvilinear, however, as at 
lower IQ levels moral reasoning is limited by cognitive development, 
whereas, at higher IQ levels moral reasoning may be either high or low 
in terms of moral maturity (.16) (Kohlberg, 1969). Arbuthnot (1972) 
found positive correlations between moral development or moral judgment 
23 
maturity and various measures of cognitive ability, such as with the 
Differential Aptitude Test (excluding clerical) (.40), with the Cali-
fornia Test of Mental Maturity (.55), the Otis (.55) and Lorge-Thorndike 
(. 50). 
Evidence of the positive relationship between measures of "ego-
strength" and moral judgment maturity has been cited (Kohlberg, 1969). 
Various aspects of ego-strength, such as IQ, the ability to anticipate 
consequences, delay gratification, control unsocialized fantasies, and 
self-esteem, have been related to indices of moral character (Kohlberg, 
1964). Grim, Kohlberg and White (1964) found that another ego-strength 
variable, the capacity to maintain stable, focused attention, contri-
butes to moral conduct. They determined stability of attention as a 
lack of variation in reaction time to the presentation of various types 
of stimuli, coupled with GSR measures. These measures correlated 
positively with behavioral measures of resistance to cheating and with 
teacher's ratings of "conscience strength." The investigators proposed 
that stable attention facilitates honesty by raising the threshold at 
which distracting thoughts of cheating can occur. 
In summary, the major constructs in Kohlberg's cognitive-
developmental theory of moral development are that level of moral 
development increases with age, that the stages form an invariant 
sequence and are culturally universal, and that moral development is 
positively related to various measures of cognitive and personality 
development. 
Relationship between Moral Judgment and Moral Action 
Kohlberg's model does not require a direct relationship between 
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moral reasoning and moral action because theoretically individuals at 
different stages can exhibit identical behavior that is supported by 
different types of reasoning. Likewise, individuals at the san1e ·stage 
can behave in dissimilar ways using identical reasoning to support their 
actions. Kohlberg's (1969) theory does have implications for behavioral 
prediction, however. 
While moral judgment maturity is only one of many predictors 
of action in moral conflict situations, it can be a quite 
powerful and meaningful predictor of action where it gives 
rise to distinctive ways of defining concrete situational 
rights and duties in socially ambiguous situations. The 
causal role of moral judgment appears to be due to its con-
tribution to a cognitive definition of the situation rather 
than because strong attitudinal or affective expressions 
activate behavior (p. 397). 
Kohlberg (1969) feels that the low correlations between self 
reported measures of honesty and actual conduct are due in part to the 
fact that the same desire to cheat may lead to the desire to present 
oneself as having high moral values. He believes that a more important 
difficulty is that these self-report indices do not include "cognitive-
structural self-critical components." In attempting to predict behav-
ior from measures of moral judgment, better results are obtained when 
cognitive and developmental measures are employed. Kohlberg 
reports that significant correlations have been found between his 
instrument and teachers' ratings of moral conscientiousness (.46), and 
with peer rating of moral character (.58). He has also found a substan-
tially lower Moral Judgment score to characterize a group of delinquent 
16-year olds than a group of non-delinquent controls. 
Ruma and Mosher (1967) found a positive relationship between level 
of moral judgment and guilt in a population of delinquent boys (.47). 
Their measure of guilt consisted of the sum of the weighted scores of 
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the boys' re~ponses to a set of questions regarding how they felt dur-
ing and after their delinquent acts (assault or theft). Level of mar.al 
judgment was determined by Kohlberg's scale. The researchers found a 
positive correlation (.31) between responses to the interview and the 
Mosher Guilt Scale, as well as a positive correlation (.55) between 
Kohlberg's scale and the measure of guilt. One shortcoming of this 
study however, is that none of the subjects were above stage 3 thus, 
there is no evidence for stages 4, 5, and 6. 
Turiel and Rothman (1972) investigated the relationship between 
moral reasoning, action and developmental change by exposing 12 to 15-
year old subjects to moral reasoning regarding a situation and the 
effect this exposure had on the subjects' actual behavior. After a 
subject's dominant stage of moral judgment was determined by Kohlberg's 
scale, he was exposed to reasoning one stage above (+l) his own stage 
in support of one course of action and one stage below (-1) his own 
stage supporting an alternative course of action. The subject was then 
required to choose between these two alternatives. The experimental 
situation involved. the subjects 1 first observing two adults designated 
as "teachers" read a word list to an adult "learner," who made spelling 
mistakes in accordance with a predetermined schedule. As a result of 
the "mistakes," the learner's chips were taken away and he began to 
complain. One teacher wanted to continue the experiment, the other 
wanted to discontinue. The results indicated that there were differen-
tial effects of reasoning exposure. There was an initial tendency for 
all subjects to choose to continue the experiment. The lower stage sub-
jects tended to persist in their choice to continue the experiment 
regardless of level of reasoning used to support either alternative. 
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On the other hand, stage 4 subjects chose to stop the e;x:periment when 
this choice was supported by the reasoning one stage above their own 
stage. Higher stage subjects integrated their behavior with the +l 
reasoning such that their choice was subordinate to the reasoning. 
Age differences in the overall process of evaluating moral judg-
ments have been found by other investigators (Keasey, 1974; Rest, et. 
al., 1969; Turiel, 1966). Looking at the relationship between opinion-
agreement and stage of supportative reasoning, and level of moral 
judgment of pre-adolescent and college females, Keasey (1974) found 
that opinion-agreement strongly enhanced the evaluation of moral judg-
ment and +l reasoning was more highly evaluated than -1 reasoning. The 
pre-adolescents seemed to be more influenced by the opinion-agreement/ 
disagreement component, a more concrete issue, than were the college 
subjects. 
Fodor (1972) administered Kohlberg's interview to 40 delinquent 
and 40 nondelinquent adolescent boys to assess their level of moral 
thought. As part of the standard interview, after the subject chooses 
between two alternatives and supports his choice with his reasoning, 
the researcher, depending on which choice the subject made and what 
kind of arguments he had given, administers a predetermined set of 
probes to determine underlying rationale. There are also built-in 
arguments to convince subjects they should change their decision, 
regardless of what the initial moral choice had been. Whether or not 
the subject is swayed, does not contribute to his Moral Judgment score. 
Fodor (1972) found that delinquents received lower Moral Judgment scores 
and those who yielded to the experimenter's efforts to dissuade him 
from his original moral choice had lower Moral Judgment scores than 
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those subjects who refused to change their original choice. Like Ruma 
and Mosher (1967) however, Fodor had very few subjects above stage 4. 
The relationship between several personality variables and actual 
behavior in a conflict situation has also been investigated (Swartz, 
Feldman, Brown & Heingartner, 1968). The researchers distinguished 
between personality characteristics that are uniquely relevant to moral 
aspects of decisions and those relevant to nonmoral cues. Level of 
moral development, as assessed by Kohlberg's dilemmas, related posi-
tively to action in two experimental situations. One situation involved 
temptation to cheat on a vocabulary test. The other involved a puzzle 
task with an accomplice who varied the pressure to be helpful. It was 
found that need for achievement, need for affiliation and level of moral 
thought were unrelated. With regard to cheating, subjects with higher 
level of moral development were less likely to cheat, those high in need 
for achievement were also less likely to cheat and no association 
between need for affiliation and cheating were found. The relationship 
between level of moral judgment and helpfulness was not statistically 
significant, but was in the predicted direction. Subjects low in need 
for achievement gave more help and there was a positive relationship 
between high need for affiliation and helpfulness. The authors, how-
ever, report some confounding, in that those subjects using principled 
moral thought (stage 5 and 6) were also more likely to be high in need 
for affiliation. Level of moral judgment predicted behavior in both 
situations, whereas need for affiliation and need for achievement were 
associated with differential situational cues. 
Haan, Smith and Block (1968) administered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment 
Scale to almost 1000 California college students and Peace Corps 
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volunteers in training and determined their level of moral judgment. 
Differences in level of moral judgment were analyzed in relation to 
political-social behavior, family background, perceptions of both 
parents, self and ideal description and various other biographical data. 
The principled morality groups (stages 5 and 6) were apt to be most 
politically active, although men in the premoral (stages 1 and 2) group 
were also highly politically active. However, individuals in the prin-
cipled groups seemed to have a more autonomous sense of self, their 
dissonant political stands were more tension free and ego-syntonic. 
Their behavior seemed guided by their interpersonal obligations. The 
premoral group, although behaving similar to the principled individuals, 
were motivated more by a concern for their own rights and needs. In 
general, the conventional morality group (stages 3 and 4) were politic-
ally inactive, accepting the traditional values of their parents and 
society. Their relationships tended to be harmonious with the tradi-
tional institutions of church, school and personal authorities. Their 
behavior, for the most part, was guided by the rules of these existing 
authorities and institutions. The researchers only analyzed those 
protocols which could be assigned to one of the "pure" moral types 
thus, 46% of the sample was excluded. 
Saltzstein, Diamond and Belenky (1972) investigated the relation-
ship between preadolescents' moral judgment level and conformity behav-
ior in a modified Asch-type group pressure situation. Conformity was 
measured under two conditions; one in which the individuals were inter-
dependent (prizes were awarded to the most accurate group) and the 
other in which they were independent (prizes awarded to the most 
accurate individual). They found that overall conformity, regardless 
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of condition, was related to moral judgment level. The subjects at 
stages 4 and 5 were least likely to conform, those at stage 3 were most 
likely to conform and subjects at stages 1 and 2 conformed at an inter-
mediate frequency. The hypothesis that more conformity would occur in 
the interdependent than in the independent goal situation failed to be 
confirmed. This failure could have been an artifact of the experimental 
procedure, but the authors also discussed the possibility that a sense 
of obligation leading to the desire to conform may only occur in an 
interdependent situation when conformity will help advance the group 
toward its goal. For higher level of moral judgment subjects the desire 
to conform may have been overridden by a sense of obligation to the 
experimenter-authority to remain accurate. 
In a study by Milgram (1963), subjects were told by an experimenter 
to administer increasingly severe "electric shocks" to a confederate 
"learner" as he made errors in a paired-associate memory task. The 
majority of subjects complied with the demands of the experimenter to 
continue shocking the "learner" despite the confederate's loud protests. 
Kohlberg (1965) reports that many of Milgram's (1963) subjects were sub-
sequently contacted and administered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale. 
It was found that the majority of subjects using stage 6 reasoning were 
those subjects that had refused to comply with the experimenter. 
Although Kohlberg's model does not require a direct relationship 
between moral reasoning and moral action the theory does have implica-
tions for predicting behavior. Subjects with higher level of moral 
development were found to be less likely to cheat (Swartz, et. al., 
1968); conformity behaviotr· is related to level of moral development 
(Saltzstein, et. al., 1972); and moral development is related to 
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political activism and various personality characteristics (Haan, et. 
al., 1968). Except for the Haan, et. al. (1968) study most of the 
research attempting to predict behavior from level of moral development 
has been limited in the number of stages used in the study. There are 
few studies that have included any sizable number of stage 5 or 6 sub-
jects. Thus, there is a paucity of experimental research providing 
data as to the strength of the relationship between level of moral 
reasoning and actual conduct. 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the relation-
ship between the moral judgment level of college students and their 
behavior. Kohlberg (1968) reports that the majority of adults and 
young adults function at the conventional level of moral development. 
Both the conventional subject and the "good subject" (Orne, 1962) are 
concerned with approval, doing what is expected, fulfilling obligations 
and demonstrating deference to authority. Thus, many college students 
participating in psychology experiments might be expected to show a 
high degree of compliance and conformity. This phenomenon has, in 
fact, been a concern of many researchers in studying artifacts of behav-
ioral science research. However, if a group of subjects were known to 
be functioning at the principled or preconventional level of morality, 
quite different expectations regarding their behavior would prevail. 
At the principled level individuals strive to define moral values 
and principles apart from the authority of the groups or persons that 
hold these principles and apart from their own identification with 
these groups. In other words, moral values and principles are upheld 
for their own sake and are not followed as a function of an external 
authority or situation. Subjects who were known to be functioning 
primarily in the principled level would be expected to be much less 
susceptible to external pressures and situational demand characteris-
tics. It can be predicted that they would uphold their moral ideals 
and principles regardless of the pressure to do otherwise. 
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On the other hand, quite different behavior predictions would be 
associated with subjects functioning at the preconventional level. 
These individuals are much more hedonistic and oriented to the conse-
quences of action, such as rewards, punishments or exchange of favors. 
They show deference to an authority or power for its own sake, rather 
than in terms of respecting the underlying moral order. These subjects 
might be expected to vascillate as a function of varying external sanc-
tions and pressures. 
This study was designed to investigate the relationship between 
the moral judgment level of college students, their conformity to the 
experimental demand characteristics and their confession of prior "ille-
gitimate" knowledge of the experimental deceptions. The subjects were 
pre-selected on the basis of their level of moral judgment. All sub-
jects received a pre-experimental tip-off, were then run through the 
experimental procedures and finally administered a post-experimental 
interview that offered them several chances to acknowledge the inf or-
mation received in the tip-off. 
More specifically, a confederate provided all subjects with full 
information regarding the purpose of the experiment and the experimental 
deceptions employed in the Valins (1966) bogus heart rate study. After 
being run through the modified Valins procedure subjects were 
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administered a post-experimental interview that provided them with 
numerous opportunities to confess their foreknowledge. In one condition 
the experimenter qualified the post-experimental interview by implicitly 
suggesting that the subject withhold the information. This was the Pact 
of Ignorance (PI) demand characteristic set. In the Scientific Integ-
rity (SI) condition the experimenter introduced the post-experimental 
interview by stressing the importance of scientifically valid and non-
contaminated data. These two conditions presented the subjects with 
differential demand characteristics to confess their prior knowledge of 
the procedures and purpose of the modified Valins study. 
Subjects in the principled level of morality tend to function more 
autonomously and according to self-chosen moral principles. Thus, it 
is expected that these subjects will be more truthful than the other 
two groups regarding the pre-experimental tip-off, regardless of the 
differential encouragement of the experimenter. Subjects at the con-
ventional level are concerned with being "good" subjects and conforming 
to the experimenter's expectations. Therefore, when the experimenter 
implicitly encourages these subjects to conceal their illegitimate 
information they will follow his implicit suggestion. However, when 
the experimenter stresses the importance of being truthful conventional 
subjects will be expected to confess to the same degree that principled 
subjects do. At the pre-conventional level subjects are expected to be 
less apt to acknowledge the tip-off regardless of the differential 
demand characteristics. These subjects are oriented towards rewards 
and punishments and are apt to be concerned with the consequences of 
having acquired illicit information about the study. Finally, previous 
research has shown that when subjects are aware of the hypothesis they 
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behave in a manner to confirm the researcher's expectations (Levy, 1967; 
Orne, 1962). Thus, it is expected that overall, the subjects will con-
fess more frequently under the SI condition than the PI condition and 
that subjects will demonstrate the Valins effect. 
The following are the specific hypotheses to be tested. 
1. Confession of awareness will be more frequent for subjects in 
the Scientific Integrity condition than for subjects in the 
Pact of Ignorance condition. 
2. Subjects whose moral judgment is at the post-conventional 
level will be more truthful about the pre-experimental tip-off 
regardless of demand characteristic condition. 
3. Subjects whose moral judgment is at the conventional level will 
be most susceptible to the demand characteristic condition, 
i.e., their confession behavior will be most variable. 
4. Subjects whose moral judgment is at the pre-conventional level 
will be least truthful (lowest confession rates) regardless of 
demand characteristic condition. 




Golding and Lichtenstein (1970), using a modified version of 
Valins' (1966) false heart-rate feedback procedures, investigated sub-
jects' confession of prior knowledge of the experimental deception. 
They found very low confession rates (10-15%) for all groups regardless 
of differential encouragement to be truthful. The present study is 
modeled after the Golding and Lichtenstein study, utilizing their 
Informed condition, their modification of Valins' procedures, and the 
post-experimental interview procedures which vary according to two types 
of demand characteristics. 
Pre-Testing 
A total of 256 male subjects enrolled in introductory psychology 
classes were administered James Rest's (1974) Defining Issues Test 
(DIT) of Moral Judgment by the female experimenter. The subjects were 
told a graduate student needed this data for his thesis and that parti-
cipation was voluntary. The full text of the experimenter's instruc-
tions for the pre-testing may be found in Appendix B. 
Defining Issues Test 
The DIT is based on Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of 
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moral development. It was designed in an attempt to assess moral judg-
ment in an objective format. The instrument is an "attempt to tap the 
basic conceptual frameworks by which a subject analyzes a social-moral 
problem and judges the proper course of action" (Rest, 1974b, p. 4-1). 
The DIT can be group administered in fifty to sixty minutes and consists 
of six hypothetical dilemmas. Each dilemma has twelve issues, or con-
siderations that define the issues of the dilemma in various ways. 
The subject's first task after reading the story is to rate each 
of these issues in· terms of their importance in making a decision about 
the dilemma. After rating each item individually, the subject must 
then choose the four most important items. These issues are keyed to 
the various theoretical stages of moral development and the rankings 
yield stage scores. Appendix B includes a copy of the DIT with the 
instructions to the subjects. 
Subjects may be assigned a p-score and a stage score. Because the 
instrument is based on Kohlberg's theory, his same basic characteriza-
tions apply to the stages derived from the DIT. The p-score is the sum 
of weighted ranks given to stage 5 and 6 items. The other stage scores 
are computed like the p-score and are interpreted similarly. For 
example, a stage 3 score is the relative importance a subject attributes 
to stage 3 reasoning. In addition to stages 2 through 6, there is an A 
score. This is an antiestablishment orientation. This is a point of 
view that condemns tradition and the existing social order for its 
arbitrariness or its corruption by the rich and exploitation of the 
poor. The A score is possibly a transition phase between conventional 
morality and principled morality (Rest, 1974b). The M-score indicates 
a subject's tendency to endorse lofty sounding but meaningless items. 
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This score serves as a caution about the validity of a subject's data. 
The DIT also utilizes a consistency check to indicate whether a 
subject's questionnaire can be used. The decision rules for determin-
ing the validity of a subject's protocol and the scoring procedures can 
be found in Appendix B. 
Validity and Reliability of the DIT 
Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, and Anderson (1974a) conducted the 
first reliability and validity study of the DIT. They administered the 
DIT to four groups (40 subjects in each group), presumed to represent 
differing advancements of moral judgment. The groups wer.e junior high 
school students (age 14), senior highs (age 17, 18), college juniors 
and seniors, and graduate students. Results indicated that the test-
retest reliability had a Pearson correlation of .81. The p-score or 
percentage of usage of stage 5 or 6 reasoning, clearly differentiated 
these four groups. Although the DIT is not a direct linear function of 
age, there should be some relationship because it is a developmental 
measure. Rest, et. al., (1974a) found the correlation with age to be 
.62. Positive correlations between the DIT and measures of social-
moral concept comprehension (.63), the Differential Ability Test and 
the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills, as a general aptitude measures (.35), 
and with Kohlberg's measure (.68) were obtained. On the other hand, 
as expected, low correlations were obtained between the DIT and IQ 
(other factors held constant), socioeconomic class and sex. 
Rest (1975) investigated directional change on the DIT in terms 
of decreases in lower stages and increases in higher stages. He also 
looked at the longitudinal change in the Comprehension of Social-Moral 
Concepts Test and Law and Order Attitude Test, which had previously 
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been found to have a high correlation with the DIT (Rest, et al.., 
1974a). Rest recontacted subjects from a study that was conducted two 
years earlier (Rest, et al., 1974a). The remaining sample used in this 
study consisted of 88 former junior high and senior high school sub-
jects. Rest (1975) found that the average p-score did increase signif-
icantly, as well as the comprehension test and significant decreases on 
the Law and Order Test. 
McGeorge (1975) gave three groups of subjects differential 
instructions to either fake good, fake bad, or record their own views 
(standard). Supporting the general theory of a sequence of cognitive 
stages of moral judgment, he found that subjects were able to fake bad, 
recognizing the stages they have passed through as inunature. On the 
other hand, they were not able to fake good. 
Rest (1974b) reports numerous studies, mostly unpublished doctoral 
dissertations showing changes in the DIT as a function of such things as 
a college course in "Deliberate Psychological Education". (Hurt, 1974, 
reported by Rest, 1974b); and the DIT changes as a function of a logics 
course versus an ethics course (Panowitsch, 1974, reported by Rest, 
1974b). 
Subject Selection 
Each subject who completed the DIT was assigned to one of 
Kohlberg's stages of moral development, in addition to being assigned a 
p-score. Invalid profiles were eliminated according to Rest's criteria 
of four inconsistent responses. In addition, only·subjects who could be 
classified into one stage or into two overlapping stages within the same 
level (e.g. stage 3, substage 4=level II) were included. There were 25 
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subjects in Level I, 51 subjects in Level II, and 30 subjects in Level 
III. As the six stages are conceptualized into three main levels, 
preconventional, conventional and postconventional, an equal number of 
subjects were randomly chosen from each of the three levels. It was 
decided to group subjects into levels because previous research (Haan; 
et al., 1968; Saltzstein & Diamond, 1972) has indicated low relative 
frequencies of college subjects in stage 1 and in stage 6. Thus, each 
subject who completed the DIT was assigned a stage score and a p-score. 
Rest has found the p-score to be the most reliable and favors it over 
stage typing. However, because of the behavioral predictions associated 
with the levels of moral development, it was decided to group subjects 
according to levels rather than by p-scores, which is a continuous 
variable. 
Subjects were contacted by phone by the author and asked to parti-
cipate in an experiment on physiological reactions to sexually oriented 
stimuli. Only two subjects contacted refused to participate. No rela-
tion between the previous pretesting and participation in the experiment 
was made. The full text of the experimenter's phone convers~tion may be 
found in Appendix C. A total of 54 subjects participated. 
The Experimenter 
A total of 11 advanced (juniors and seniors) undergraduate psychol-
ogy majors served as the experimenter and confederate. These under-
graduates were all male and were trained by the author to play the roles 
of both the confederate and experimenter. The confederate was not aware 
of which post-experimental interview set the subject was to receive and 
neither confederate nor experimenter was aware of the subjects' level 
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of moral judgment. 
Experimental Procedure 
When the subject arrived at the designated place of the experiment, 
he was met by the experimenter, who explained that there was a prelimi-
nary questionnaire on biographical data to be completed. The experi-
menter led the subject to a room with a sign on the door saying "Waiting 
Room." There was also a "Do Not Disturb" sign posted on the door. The 
experimenter attempted to open the door but found it locked, remarking, 
"I guess this room is being used for another experiment." He then 
walked down the hall to a door labeled "Learning Experiment-Waiting 
Room," saying, "I think it will be o.k. to put you in here." Upon 
entering the room, they found the confederate intently filling out a 
form. The experimenter asked, "Would it disturb you if my subject 
filled out this questionnaire in here?" The confederate looked up 
·briefly and said, "No." The subject was instructed to complete the 
form and was told that the experimenter would return in about 10 minutes 
to run him in the experiment. 
The purpose of this procedure was to reduce the subject's suspi-
ciousness of the confederate's affiliation with the experiment. Golding 
and Lichtenstein (1970) reported that only 3.3% of their subjects 
believed that the confederate was working for the experimenter. Thus, 
they assumed that this procedure effectively led subjects to believe the 
confederate was a subject participating in a different experiment. 
Design 
Subjects within each of the three moral development levels were 
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randomly assigned to one of the two post-experimental interview condi-
tions, Pact of Ignorance (PI) or Scientific Integrity (SI), in a 2 x 3 
randomized blocks design. 
Prior Information Manipulation 
After the subject in the "Learning-Experiment" waiting room had 
completed the questionnaire, the confederate engaged him in 1:1 casual 
conversation asking, "Which experiment are you in?". Subjects were 
then told of the deception employed in Valins' procedure. These com-
ments were identical to those used in the Golding and Lichtenstein 
(1970) study and the full text of the experimenter's and confederate's 
comments can be found in Appendix C. 
Modified Valins Procedure 
After being taken to another room by the experimenter, the subject 
was told that this was a study of physiological reactions to sexually 
oriented stimuli. His heart rate would be recorded in response to six 
slides of seminude women. Valins' (1966) instructions to the subjects 
were employed in the present study and can be found in Appendix C. The 
experimenter, after giving the instructions, then taped two small elec-
trodes to the subject's forearm and started the tape recorder. Instead 
of their own heart sounds, the subjects actually heard prerecorded heart 
beats being played directly from the recorder through the speaker. 
Valins (1966) had employed heart rate increase, heart rate decrease and 
extraneous sound conditions. For the purpose of simplification, the 
present study, as in the Golding and Lichtenstein experiment, only used 
the heart rate increase condition. The original Golding and 
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Lichtenstein prerecorded heart beats were employed in the present study. 
Twelve color slides were made from magazine photographs of six 
seminude females. For each subject the order of presentation of the 
six slides was randomized. The projection of the slides was synchro-
nized with the recording of the heart beats. Each slide appeared three 
seconds after the beginning of the minute interval and remained on for 
15 seconds. For the first two minutes, the subject heard heart beat 
sounds occuring at a normal or resting rate. After the first slide was 
projected, he heard the heart beat sound increase. After 15 seconds of 
observing the slide, the heart rate slowly returned to normal. The sub-
ject thus heard the heart rate increase for three of the six pictures. 
Following the two minute rest, the slides were shown again in the iden-
tical order and associated with the same heart sounds. 
After the heart rate recording, the subject was told that the 
experimenter wanted to reduce the number of slides he was using. Thus, 
he was asking all subjects to rate the slides according to their attrac-
tiveness so that he could retain the most appealing photos. As in 
Valins' study and in the Golding and Lichtenstein study, the subjects 
in the present experiment saw the six slides again quickly, and were 
instructed to rate them according to attractiveness using a 100-point 
scale, ranging from "Not at all" to "Extremely." The subject was then 
told that the experimenter wanted to discuss his reactions to the exper-
iment with him. 
Interview Procedure 
Each subject within the three levels of moral judgment were ran-
domly assigned to one of the interview conditions, which differed 
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according to their social demand characteristics. In the Pact of 
Ignorance (PI) condition, the experimenter implicitly condoned the 
subject's withholding knowledge of the experimental deception proce-
dures. The PI interview set was designed to influence the subject to 
play the role of a "good subject" and conceal the fact that he had pre-
experimental information that would invalidate his performance. In the 
Scientific Integrity (SI) interview set the experimenter explicitly 
condoned the subject's confession of prior knowledge, emphasizing the 
importance of getting valid data. 
Dependent Variable Measures 
Post-Experimental Interview 
A 12 question interview modeled after Golding and Lichtenstein's 
(1970) 13-question interview was developed. It was felt that the ques-
tions should be re-ordered from most general (i.e., Have you ever read 
of any experiments like this one?) to most specific (i.e., Did you hear 
anything about the experiment from anyone who had been a subject 
earlier?) With this re-ordering a subject was not forced to connnit 
himself to confessing at the beginning of the interview, but it became 
increasingly difficult to withhold the information without lying as the 
questions became more direct. In addition, the wording of various 
questions was changed so that the subject would not feel caught in a 
lie. For example, the word "your" heart beats was changed to "the" 
heart beats. 
Rather than have the experimenter record the subjects' responses 
verbatim and then have independent judges rate each protocol, the exper-
imenter classified each response on the Interview Rating Sheet as the 
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subject responded to each question. The various possible response 
categories for each question was determined by a pilot study. If the 
experimenter was uncertain about the category of a response he recorded 
it verbatim on the sheet. 
The experimenter was allowed to make one probe per question under 
specified conditions. In general the experimenter probed when the sub-
ject indicated that he did not believe the heart beats were his own or 
that the subject was aware of what the purpose of the experiment was. 
The situations where probes were permitted were indicated on the inter-
view rating sheet. The probe was limited to a one or two word question 
such as "Why not?" or "What?"• 
The scoring system was based on the rationale that a subject who 
confessed earlier in the interview was more forthright than a subject 
who withheld information all the way through the interview and then 
confessed on the last question. It was also felt that.subjects who give 
partial information regarding their awareness, even without a full con-
fession, are behaving differently than subjects who flatly deny any 
prior knowledge. Thus, a subject who confessed early in the interview 
or even before the interview began received more points for the conf es-
sion than a subject who confessed on the last question. In addition, 
for each question the various response categories and point values 
assigned to each category took into consideration how much partial 
information the subject was providing. For example, for the first 
·question "Have you ever read of any experiments like this one?" the 
response categories and associated point values were: no=O; maybe or 
vague•!; yes=2; confession=70. 
A confession was defined as "mentioning that the confederate told 
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him that his heart beats were phoney or that the confederate told him 
that the experimenter was going to try to make him rate some pictures 
as attractive because the heart rate increases." Therefore, the subject 
had to implicate the confederate. The interview was discontinued at the 
point at which the subject confessed. Thus, the confession category was 
included under each question and assigned a different point value. A 
confession on question one was worth 70 points whereas a confession on 
question 12 was worth 30 points. A subject's total confession score 
was found by adding the points received for each question. If a subject 
confessed on question 6, he received 52 points for confessing plus the 
point values for his responses on questions one through 5. Subjects who 
confessed could receive a score between 30 and 70 and subjects who did 
not confess could receive between 0 and 29 points. In the pilot study 
this instrument was also tested on subjects who had not received the 
tip-off from the confederate. That is, they had no information to con-
fess. The mean confession rate of these subjects was 10, which may be 
considered the basal score of this instrument. 
Valine Effect 
Mean values on the attractiveness scale of each subject's ratings 
of the three reinforced (R) and nonreinforced (basal) (NR) slides were 
obtained for each. The net "Valina effect," R-NR, was also obtained 
for each subject. 
The post-experimental interview, as well as the experimenter's 
comments in the PI and SI conditions, the Interview Rating Sheet, 
instructions for the picture attractiveness rating and the Picture 
Attractiveness Scale may be found in Appendix D. 
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Debriefing 
After all 54 subjects were run and the data was analyzed, each 
participant was given a sheet explaining the full study and pertinent 
results. Subjects were also given the opportunity to ask questions in 
person. The debriefing is included in Appendix E. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
In this section the major hypotheses of the study will be restated 
and the results pertinent to each will be presented. 
Hypothesis 1: Confession of awareness will be more frequent for subjects 
in the Scientific Integrity (SI) condition than for subjects in the Pact 
of Ignorance (PI) condition. 
The data do not support this hypothesis. The two post-experimental 
interview conditions were not significantly related to differential con-
fession rates. That is, there were no differences between these two 
groups. The means and standard deviations of the confession of aware-
ness data for the two interview conditions are presented in Table 1. 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects whose moral judgment is at the post-conventional 
level (Level III) will be more truthful (highest confession rates) 
about the pre-experimental tip-off regardless of demand characteristic 
condition. 
The data do not support this hypothesis. Subjects whose moral 
judgment was at the post-conventional level did have the highest mean 
confession scores as hypothesized, but this was non-significant. In 
addition, contrary to the prediction, the confession rates of these 
subjects was most variable between the two interview conditions, 
although this variability was not significant. The means and standard 
deviations of the confession data for the two interview conditions and 
three levels of moral judgment are presented in Table 2. The results 
of the analyses of variance for confession are presented in Table 3. 
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Hypothesis 3: Subjects whose moral judgment is at the conventional level 
(Level II) will be most susceptible to the demand characteristic condi-
tion, i.e., their confession behavior will be most variable. 
The data, presented in Tables 2 and 3, do not support this hypoth-
esis. These subjects did not confess more under the SI demand charac-
teristic condition than under the PI condition to a significant degree 
and their confession rates were not the most variable of the three 
levels of moral judgment. 
Hypothesis 4: Subjects whose moral judgment is at the pre-conventional 
level (Level I) will be least truthful. That is, these subjects will 
have the lowest confession rates regardless of demand characteristic 
condition. 
The data do not support this hypothesis. Subjects whose moral 
judgment was at the pre-conventional level did not produce the lowest 
confession rates. In addition, the confession rates of these subjects 
was variable between the two interview conditions, although the differ-
ence between conditions was not significant. The data is presented in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
The results of the analyses of variance, presented in Table 3, 
indicate that no group is significantly different from any other group. 
The F tests for main effects and interaction were all nonsignificant. 
Thus, hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 were not supported by the data. 
Hypothesis 5: Subjects will demonstrate the Valins effect. 
This hypothesis was confirmed. The magnitude of this effect for 
informed subjects was less than the effect demonstrated by previous 
research (Golding and Lichtenstein, 1970). The reinforced slides were 
rated as more attractive than non-reinforced slides by subjects in the 
conventional and post-conventional level of moral judgment. However, 
subjects at the pre-conyentional level did not demonstrate the Valins 
effect. The means and standard deviations for the Valina effect for the 
three levels of moral judgment are presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 1 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR CONFESSION 
RATES FOR SI AND PI INTERVIEW CONDITIONS 
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Interview Condition Mean Standard Deviation 
Scientific Integrity 22.56 16.13 
Pact of Ignorance 24.93 16.47 
TABLE 2 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR CONFESSION RATES FOR 
LEVEL OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND INTERVIEW CONDITION 
Interview Condition Level Mean Standard Deviation 
Scientific Integrity I 22.11 17.82 
II 22.44 13.13 
III 30.22 18.85 
Pact of Ignorance I 24.89 19.62 
II 19.56 16.43 
III 23.22 15.07 
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TABLE 3 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CONFESSION 
Sum of 
Source Squares df F Ratio 
A (INTCOND) 75.8519 1 75.85185 0.2802 NS 
B (MORD EV) 296.2593 2 148.4629 0.5471 NS 
AB 216.9259 2 108.4629 0.4006 NS 
RESIDUAL 12995.3333 48 270.7361 
TABLE 4 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VALINS EFFECT 
Level of Moral Standard 
Development Mean Deviation 
Preconventional -.87 15.66 
Conventional 5.10 17.73 
Post conventional 5.32 14.28 
Total 3.18 16.36 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
There were five specific hypotheses that were tested in this study. 
These hypotheses can be conceptualized into three general hypotheses. 
The first hypotheses related to the effect of the post-experimental 
demand characteristic conditions on confession rate. The second general 
hypothesis was manifested by three specific hypotheses and related to 
the predictions regarding confession rates associated with the three 
levels of moral judgment. The final hypothesis was that the Valina 
effect would be replicated. 
The first general hypothesis of this study was that confession of 
awareness would be higher under the Scientific Integrity (SI) demand 
characteristic condition than under the Pact of Ignorance (PI) condi-
tion. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. 
Golding and Lichtenst~in (1970), using the same demand character-
istic conditions, found significantly more admission of prior informa-
tion (i.e., acknowledgment of a prior conversation with the confederate) 
under the SI condition than under the PI condition for their informed 
subjects. However, they did not find differences in confessed aware-
ness of the experimental manipulations under either condition. In the 
present study one confession scale was used, where confession was 
defined as both admitting having a conversation with the confederate as 
well as some mention of knowledge of the experimental manipulations. 
50 
51 
It was felt that a true confession was more than just admitting having 
a prior conversation alone or simply admitting awareness of the experi-
mental manipulations because a subject could score high on either one of 
these scales without really having to be totally truthful. In fact, 
many subjects in the present study admitted that they did have a conver-
sation with the confederate, but that "he didn't say much" or "I wasn't 
paying attention." However, these same subjects denied knowing anything 
about the experimental manipulations or purpose of the study even though 
the confederate had given them all this information. It is possible 
that significant differences between the SI and PI conditions for an 
admission of a prior conversation might have been obtained if the same 
two scales as used by Golding and Lichtenstein had been employed. How-
ever, their distinction between the two scales seems arbitrary and arti-
ficial. 
One difficulty with the SI and PI conditions that might have con-
tributed to the lack of significant difference was that they were deliv-
ered verbally and involved rather subtle clues that were designed to 
create a certain set in the subjects' minds. There are a multitude of 
possible extraneous variables that could have been operating to confound 
the clear differences between the two conditions. For example, one 
methodological problem with the study was that 11 male undergraduates 
served as both confederates and experimenters. It is possible that 
idiosyncratic differences in style clouded the distinction between the 
two conditions. That is, the implicit message associated with each 
condition may not have gotten through to all of the subjects. 
Other factors, such as the experimenters' youthful appearance may 
have led subjects to question the authority of the experimenters. Orne 
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(1962) notes that a subject's response to various subtle demand charac-
teristics is not simply conscious compliance. Numerous situational 
variables in the experiment "help define the role of 'good experimental 
subject' and the responses of the subject are a function of the role 
that is created" (Orne, 1962, p. 779). Thus, the experimenter-subject 
role might not have been as clearly defined as necessary for subjects to 
respond differentially to the SI and PI conditions. 
It is possible that the effectiveness of the post-experimental 
interview demand characteristic conditions were contingent upon subjects 
assuming either a "good subject" (Orne, 1962) or "faithful subject" 
(Fillenbaum, 1966) role. Orne· (1962) has described the "good subject" 
as one who behaves in such a manner as to confirm the experimental 
hypothesis. This subject is very compliant, has high regard for the 
aims of science and is greatly concerned that his performance be valid, 
meaningful and useful to science or the experimenter. The "faithful 
subject," who believes that he must be docile and follow the experi-
mental instructions exactly, is similar in many ways to the "good sub-
ject." The paradox in the present experimental situation is that the 
good or faithful subject is one who would be sensitive to and compliant 
with the differential implicit demands of the two conditions, and he 
would confess more under the SI condition than PI condition. However, 
a confession would render the subject's performance invalid, which is 
exactly what the "good subject" role is geared to prevent. In general, 
subjects seemed more willing to admit having a vague prior conversation 
than to admit knowledge of the experimental manipulations. This is 
what Golding and Lichtenstein had found. It is possible that admitting 
knowledge of the experimental manipulations is viewed by the subject as 
a greater invalidation of his performance. Thus, subjects felt they 
were maintaining their good subject role by withholding information 
regardless of encouragement to do otherwise. 
53 
It is also possible that the subjects adopted one of the other 
subject roles, such as the "negativistic" (Weber & Cook, 1972) or 
"apprehensive" subject role (Reicken, 1962; Rosenberg, 1965). The 
negativistic subject behaves in a way that disconfirms the experi-
menter's hypothesis, whereas, the apprehensive subject behaves in a 
manner to avoid receiving a negative evaluation from the experimenter. 
One can only speculate as to what the subjects' frame of mind was by 
the time of the post-experimental interview. The subject was initially 
contacted by telephone by a female experimenter and asked to participate 
in an experiment where he would view slides of semi-nude females. The 
subjects were uniformly enthusiastic and agreeable to participate with 
only one subject refusing and another subject's wife forbidding parti-
cipation. Thus, the subjects arrived at the experiment expecting to be 
in a study of physiological reactions to sexually oriented stimuli. 
They were placed in a room with a previous "subject" and immediately 
told that the experiment is a fake and they had been brought here under 
false pretenses. Without exception, every subject allowed himself to be 
run through the study and "played along" as the experimenter continued 
to "lie" to him. It can be expected that this state of affairs might 
have angered subjects, influenced their perception of the validity of 
scientific value of the whole study, and reduced their trust and respect 
for the experimenter. In essence, it is rather hypocritical for the 
experimenter to be making a plea for honesty when he, himself, has just 
lied to the subject. It is quite plausible for these "angered" subjects 
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to adopt a negativistic subject role and simply tune out the implicit 
demands of either t~e SI or PI condition, or just become uninvolved in 
the study and avoid any type of confrontation (i.e., confession). 
On the other hand, as mentioned, all subjects allowed themselves 
to be run through the study. Thus, the "apprehensive subject" may have 
felt caught in a bind, not having anticipated the post-experimental 
interview. These subjects are motivated to present themselves favorably 
to the experimenter and to confess would mean that they had faked their 
performance during the entire experiment. 
In summary, there are various possible explanations as to why no 
differences were found in confession rates for subjects in the PI and 
SI post-experimental interview conditions. The methodological problem 
of attempting to influence a subject's behavior by creating a certain 
set through verbal instructions seems to be the most serious difficulty. 
Another complicating factor was the large number of experimenters used 
in the study although there were no systematic experimenter effects in 
confession rates. Finally, one can only speculate as to the variety of 
subject roles that were assumed and how subjects in the various roles 
would respond to the differential demand characteristics to confess. 
The second general hypothesis of the study was the level of moral 
judgment would relate to subjects' truthfulness regarding their fore-
knowledge of the experimental deception procedures. This general 
hypothesis was manifested in three specific hypotheses concerning the 
three levels of moral judgment and their associated characteristics. 
None of these hypotheses were supported. 
The most serious methodological problem with the study relates to 
the manner in which subjects were grouped into levels of moral judgment. 
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Despite the fact that Rest favors using the p-score, or relative impor-
tance a subject gives to principled (stage 5 and 6) moral considera-
tions, it was decided to use stage-typing because of the behavioral 
predictions associated with the three levels of moral development. 
Thus, subjects were assigned to groups on the basis of their stage type 
rather. than p-score. However, regression analysis indicated that the 
p-score accounted for more variability in confession score (r2 = .07, 
p<.05) than did level of moral development (r2 = .007, ns). 
One would assume a very high positive correlation between p-score 
and stage of moral judgment. This is generally, but not always the sit-
uation. A subject may be typed stage two, but can still utilize some 
principled thinking. In the present study the correlations between 
p-score and level of moral development were only moderate (Spearman 
r = 62; Kendall Tau= .48). These moderate correlations indicate that 
there was variability within the three levels of moral judgment, with 
some subjects within a group having much higher p-scores than others. 
In addition, the three groups, although comprising different stages, 
overlapped in their p-scores. Thus, rather than have three distinct, 
homogeneous groups representing differing levels of moral judgment, 
there was, in fact, both too much variability within the groups as well 
as overlap between the groups. In retrospect, the three groups should 
have been selected on the basis of both stage-type and p-score to get 
the most consistent indication of moral judgment level. 
Since it has been shown in this study that level of moral judgment 
is not a strong predictor of confession of awareness, aside from the 
methodological problem of group selection, one can now only speculate 
as to what possible alternative factors, such as reasons, motives and 
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emotions, were operating and wonder about their relationship to confes-
sion of awareness. There are various factors that complicate the rela-
tionship between moral judgment and actual conduct. In general, the 
moral stages have been operationally defined as a score that indicates 
the manner in which a subject constructs a solution to a moral dilemma 
and the considerations he has used in reaching his solution. The judg-
ment score is an assessment of how a subject thinks about moral prob-
lems, sophistication in thinking and ways of problem solving. "Valid 
moral judgment assessment does depend on the subject using problem 
solving. strategies that are typical of him, however stage scoring 
doesn't depend on a subject's accurate prediction of his actual behav-
ior" (Rest, 1974, p. 67). 
The finding that level of moral judgment was not significantly 
related to confession of awareness seems to be due, in part, to the 
differences between these two variables. That is, on one hand, the 
subject fills out a questionnaire and thinks about how someone else 
should resolve a hypothetical moral situation. He is then posed with 
an actual dilemma where he has to make a behqvioral choice, i.e., should 
he be truthful or not? A basic problem in utilizing paper and pencil 
measures of hypothetical moral dilemmas in predicting behavior in a 
conflict situation is that a hypothetical moral situation lacks the 
same immediacy as an actual moral conflict. The individual's own sit-
uational reasons, motives, wants and emotions, which clash with the 
principle of, for example, truth telling, contributes to the experienc-
ing of the moral dilemma. 
Individuals also have other values besides their moral values. 
When an actual moral conflict occurs, other concerns may take precedence 
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over the directives that come from moral judgment or understanding. In 
addition, moral value systems may not play the same role in each per-
son 1 s life. Just because an individual has sophisticated moral under-
standing, this does not necessarily mean that moral judgment plays a 
central role in his personality organization. Rather, one individual 
may be more governed by situational pressures and habitual patterns 
than another. For example, in this study the observation was made that 
regardless of whether a subject eventually confessed or not, there was 
a wide range of subject behavior during the interview. Some subjects 
were noticeably stressed, some had poor eye contact or looked obviously 
guilty. Other subjects appeared very calm and were quite convincing 
as they refused to admit their prior knowledge. However, these vari-
ables were not studied systematically, thus their relationship to level 
of moral judgment is not known. 
Previous research on the admission of prior information in a decep-
tion paradigm has shown low confession rates (Denner, 1967; Freedman, 
Wallington & Bless, 1967, Golding & Lichtenstein, 1970; Levy, 1967; 
Lichtenstein, 1968). Regardless of the length of interview and manip-
ulation of interview demand characteristics,10% to 15% of the subjects 
admit their foreknowledge. Thus, subjects tend not to divulge their 
knowledge regardless of type or extensiveness. of the post-experimental 
interview. 
The confession rates in this study were somewhat higher than those 
found by other researchers. In the present study, 18 subjects or 33%, 
told the experimenter about their conversation with the confederate 
(i.e., confessed). Of the subjects that did confess, 8 or 44% of them 
were from the highest level of moral development. Thus, it appears 
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that the higher confession rates found in this study could be due, in 
part, to the subjects known to be higher in level of moral judgment, 
even though this variable did not significantly predict confession. 
In summary, the lack of a significant relationship between level 
of moral judgment, susceptibility to demand characteristics and confes-
sion rates is due to several factors. The variability within the three 
· levels and the overlap between these groups most likely contaminated 
the predictions associated with each level of moral judgment. In 
addition, even with discrete groups there. are a variety of factors that 
complicate the relationship between moral judgment and actual conduct. 
The final hypothesis was that subjects would demonstrate the 
Valins' effect. This hypothesis was confirmed, although the magnitude 
of this effect was less than demonstrated by previous research (Golding 
& Lichtenstein, 1970; Valins, 1966). Valins (1966) found that the mean 
ratings of the reinforced pictures was 72.42 and the mean of the non-
reinforced pictures was 54.11 for his heart rate increase condition, a 
difference of 18.31. Valins also had a heart rate decrease condition 
where he hypothesized similar higher attractiveness rating effects for 
the reinforced pictures. In the heart rate decrease condition the means 
were 69.26 for reinforced pictures and 62.57 for non-reinforced pic-
tures, a difference of 6.69. According to Valins, "in order to be 
effective the manipulation of differential heart rate feedback must be 
accurately perceived by the subjects and adequately accepted as a 
reflection of their internal reactions" (Valins, 1966, p. 404). All of 
Valina' subjects believed that the heart beats were their own. In the 
present study, employing only heart rate increase condition, the mean 
of the reinforced pictures was 71.47 and the mean of the nonreinforced 
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pictures was 66.90, a difference of 4.57. The overall Valins' effect 
in the present study was 3.18, which was somewhat lower than the Valins' 
effect of 11.77 obtained by Golding and Lichtenstein (1970) for their 
informed subjects. 
It must be remembered that in the present study the subjects knew 
beforehand that the heart beats were not their own. Thus, one would 
expect a somewhat lower Valins' effect. The fact that subjects in this 
study demonstrated the Valins' effect at all is congruent with previous 
research showing that informed subjects generally produce the expected 
experimental effect (Levy, 1967). However, subjects in the preconven-
tional level of moral judgment did not produce the Valina' effect, 
although the difference between the three groups was not significant. 
In conclusion, the main purpose of this study was to test the 
relationship between level of moral judgment, susceptibility to demand 
characteristics and actual conduct. It was found that regardless of 
level of moral judgment or differential encouragement to be truthful 
approximately 75% of the subjects did not confess their foreknowledge 
of the experimental deceptions and admit their prior conversation with 
the confederate. However, it is felt that the relationship between 
level of moral judgment and actual conduct was not adequately tested 
in this study because of the previously discussed methodological prob-
lem in the selected criteria for grouping subjects. 
This study does have implications for an important aspect of almost 
all psychological research, our debriefing procedures. The extended 
post-experimental interview, with an objective means to rate awareness 
provided more non-naive subjects with the opportunity to disqualify 
themselves from a study, as well as provide the researcher with a more 
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uniform criteria for eliminating invalid data. It was found that 
approximately 25% of the subjects in the present study confessed, as 
compared withl0% to 15% found in previous research (e.g., Golding & 
Lichtenstein, 1970). Despite the improved rate of admission, it still 
seems unacceptable that only 25% of the fully informed subjects are 
honest about the invalidity of their data. More research in this area 
seems crucial. For example, one possibility would be to allow subjects 
to fill out an awareness questionnaire instead of responding to the 
experimenter's questioning directly. Perhaps in eliminating the face-
to-face encounter, subjects might feel more comfortable in admitting 
their awareness. Thus, the adequacy of our current debriefing proce-
dures as a means of assessing the validity or degree of contamination 
of our research remains a problem for psychologists that needs further 
investigation. 
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Instrumental Purpose, and 
Exchan1e 
LEVEL II-CONVENTIONAL 
Staae 3-Mutual Interpersonal 
Expectations, Relationships, nnd 
lnterpenonal Conformity 





Stage S-Social Contract or 
Utility and Individual Righi. 
Stage 6-Universal Ethical 
Principles 
The Six Moral Stni:rs 
Content of Stag~ 
What Is Right 
To ·'void br•aking rules 
backed by punishment, 
obedi~nce for its own sake, 
and avoiding physical damaae 
to persons and property. 
Following mies only when 
it is to someone's immediate 
intcrcsl; acting to meet one's 
own interc:sls and needs and 
letting others do the same. 
Right is also what's fair, 
what's an equal exchange, a 
deal, an agreement. 
Living ur to what is expected 
by people close to you or what 
people generally expect of 
people in your role as son, 
brother, friend, etc. "Being 
good" is important and means 
having good motives, showing 
concern about others. It also 
means keeping mutual rcla· 
tionships, such as trust, loyalty, 
respect and gratitude. 
Fulfilling the actual durics to 
which you have agreed. Laws 
are to be upheld except in 
extreme cases where they 
conflict with other fixed social 
duties. Right is also contributing 
to society, the group, or 
institution. 
Being aware that people hold 
a variety of values an<l 
opinions, that most values and 
rules are relative to your group. 
These relative rules should 
usually be upheld, however, in 
the interest of impartiality and 
because: they arc rhe social 
contract. Some nonrelative 
values and rights like Ii/• and 
ui,,r1y, however, must be 
upheld in any society and 
regardless of majority opinion. 
Following self-chosen ethical 
principles. Particular laws or 
social agreements are usually 
valid because thC'y rest on 
• such principles. When laws 
violate these principles, one 
acts in accordance with the 
pri;;ciplc. Principles are 
universal principles of justice: 
the equality of human rights 
and respect for rhe dignity of 
human beings as individual 
persons. 
Reasons for Doing Right 
Avoidance of punishment, 
and the superior power of 
authorities. 
To serve one's own needs or 
interests in a world where you 
have to recognize that other 
people have rheir interests, too. 
The need 10 be a good person 
in your own eyes and those 
of others. Your caring for 
others. Belief in the Golden 
Ruic. Desire to maintain rules 
and authority which support 
stereotypical good behavior. 
To keep the institution going 
as a whole, to avoid the 
breakdown in the system "if 
everyone did it." or the impera-
tive of conscience to meet 
one's defined obligations 
(Easily confused with Srage 3 
belief in rules and authority; 
sec text.) 
A sense of obligation to law 
because of one's social contract 
to make and abide by laws 
for the welfare of all and for 
the protection of all people's 
rights. A feeling of contractual 
commitmenr. freely entercJ 
upon, to family, friendship, 
trust, and work ohligations. 
Concern that laws and duties 
be based on rational calculation 
of overall utility, "the greatest 
good for the greatest number.0 
The belief as a rational person 
in the validity of universal 
moral principles, and a sense 
of .personal commitment to 
them. 
Social Pasprcrive of Stage 
Egocemric point of view. Doesn't 
consider the interests of others 
or recognize that they differ from 
the actor's; doesn't relate two 
points of view. Actions are 
considered physically rather than 
in terms of psychol<;>gical interests 
of others. Confusion of authority's 
perspective with one's own. 
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Coricreu individunli.Hic pcrspectiv~. 
Aware that everybody has his 
own interest to pursue and these 
conflict, so that right is relative 
('in the concrete individualistic 
sense). 
Paspectiw· of 1/ic i11divid11al iii 
relationships with otlrer i11di~ 
vitluals. Aware of shared fceling9, 
a~recmcnts, and expectations · 
which take primacy over 
individual interests. Relates poinl3 
of view through the concrete 
Golden Ruic, putting yourself in 
the other guy's shoes. Does not 
yet consider generalized systCm 
perspective. 
Differen1ia1es societal point of 
view from imerpersonal agreement 
or motives. Takes the point of 
view of the system that defines 
roles and rules. Considers indi· 
vidual relations in terms of place 
in the system. 
Prior-to-society paspecrfre. 
Perspective of a rational individual 
awrire of values and rights prior 
to social attachments and contracts. 
Integrates perspectives by formal 
mechanisms of agreement, con-
tract, objective impartiality, and 
due process. Considers moral and 
legal points of view: recognizeS 
that they sometimes conflict and 
finds it difficult to integrate rhe·m. 
Perspecrfre of a moral point of 
view from which social arrange-
ments derive. Perspective is that 
of any rational individual recog-
nizing the nature of morality or 
the fact that persons arc ends in 
themselves and must be tre:::i.ted as 
such. 
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Instructions to Subjects 
This instrument is a questionnaire aimed at understanding how 
people think about social problems. It is a test of moral reasoning or 
moral judgment. We are interested in your opinions about controversial 
social issues. Different people have different opinions so there are 
no wrong or right answers. 
A graduate student is using this scale in her research and would 
greatly appreciate your cooperation. Of course, participation is volun-
tary. We will not be able to give you immediate feedback on the results 
of this questionnaire nor your individual score. However, near the end 
of the semester, once the data is analyzed you will receive a summary of 
the experiment. 
On the first page of the questionnaire please indicate your sex: 
male or female; your name and phone number. If you do not have a phone 
yet, just note the street on which you live. It is very important that 
we have this information should we need to recontact you for clarifica-
tion. Your responses to this questionnaire will remain confidential and 
all protocols will be destroyed once the data is collected. 
The questionnaire consists of several stories or dilemmas. Your 
first task, once you have.read the story, will be to read the 12 state-
ments and rate each one according to how important a consideration you 
feel it is in resolving the problem. If you don't understand a state-
ment or if it sounds like gibberish or nonsense to you, mark it "no 
importance." 
Your second task for each story will be to rank your first most 
important statement, then second, third and fourth. 
Please begin by reading the example story about Frank Jones and 
his car on pages one and two, then proceed with.the rest of the ques-
tionnaire. If you have any questions, just raise your hand. You should 
have 14 pages. Once again, make sure that your questionnaire is com-
plete and that you have indicated your name, sex and phone number on the 
front. 
2. SCORING '!'BE D.I.T. 
Stage scores, Including the "P" Score 
If you are hand scorinq your questionnaires, follow these steps: 









Stage 2 3 4 SA SB 6 A 
2. Only look at first four rankings at bottom of test page •. 
M 
3. For the "question" marked as most important (Rank·#!) consult 
the .. chart below to find out what stage the itet"I exeIT1pli.fies. For 
instance, if .a-subject's.first rank on the Heinz story was question 















3 4 5 
2 M 3 
2 SA SA 
A 4 6 
A 2 SA 
3 2 6 








7 8 9 10 11 12 
M 6 A SA 3 SA 
6 4, 3 A SB 4 
3 4 3 4 SA SA 
3 6 4 SB 4 SA 
SA SA SB 3 4-'° 3. 
3 3· SB SA 4 3 
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p 
2. Take each staee score for a subject an~ convert it to a stan-
dardized score (using the ori3inal sam1:1le·--Rest et al., 1974--of juniors. 
seniors, college and grad Ss as t..'1e reference ·group) , as follows--
a. Take the stage 2 score .(not perce_?~a3e) • subtract fr~t it 
4.131, then divide by 3.665; 
b. Take the staee 3 score. subtract from it 9.61?, then divide 
by 5.676: 
c. Take the stage 4 score, subtract from it 15.01?, then divide 
by 6. 9•J3~ 
d. Take the stage SA score, subtract fron it 15.344, then divide 
e. Take the stage SJ score, subtract frOill it 5.719, then divide 
by 3.46.'.l~ 
f. Take the sta.ge 6 score, subtract frot1 it 4.h.37, then divide 
by 3.4!:3, 
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e· · Tal::.e the A score, subtract fro~ it 2.469, then divide by 2.431, 
h. Take the ii score, subtract frot! it 2.712 1 then divide by 2.417. 
~Tote that the standardized stage scores may be positive or ne:>,ative. A 
score of +l.'lJO indicates t~1at the subject has used tl".at sta:?;e one standard 
deviation above the averase--in other words, the subject has attribute<l 
an exceptional dceree of importance to issues keyed at that staee. 
3. Locate those stage scores which exceed +l.000. If there is onlv 
one such score, desip;nate the suhiect as that type. If t'..1ere are t't10 
hip:h scores, desisnate the subject by the hi3hest scoi:e •·Tith a subdoninant 
type of the other scores above +l.0'JO. If no scores are !i:reuter t~1an 
+1.008, then the subject has not endorsed any stage orientation exceptionally 
and the su'Jject cannot be 11 typed. ,. EJtpect about l'.) to 20% of your sam-2le 
to be non-types. 
4.. After finding the item's stage, weight the choices by giving 
a weight of ! to the first choice, 2.. to the second choice, 2 to the 
third choice, and ! to the fourth choice. 
5. For each lst,2nd, 3rd, and 4th choice in the 6 stories, enter 
the appropriate weight in the stage column on the subject's DATA SHEET. 
For instance, in the example abOve where the first choice was a stage 4 
item, enter a weight of 4 on the data sheet under stage 4 across the 
Heinz story. 
6. The completed table on the DATA SHEET will have 4 entries for 
every story and 24 entries altogether. (There may be more than one 
entry in a box, e.g., a first and second choice on the Heinz story 
of a stage 4 item.) 
7. On the subject's DATA SHEET, total each stage column (e.g., 
for stage 2 column, add numbers by Heinz· story, Student story, Prisoner, 
·etc.). 
e. To get the "Principled" morality score ("P"), add the subtotals 
together from stages SA, SB, and 6. This is interpreted as "the relative 
importance attributed to principled moral considerations" in making a 
moral decision. 
9. You may want to express the totals in ter.ns of percentages, 
in ~hich case divide the raw score by 60. Note that the P score (as a 
percentage) can range from 0 to 95 instead of 100 due to the fact that 
on 3 stories there is no fourth possible Principled item to choose. 
Consistency Check · 
Check the reliability of your data by observing the consistency 
between a subject's ratings and rankings. If a subject ranks an item 
1st, then his ratinos for that item should have no other items higher 
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(although other items may tie in rating)~ Similarly, if a subject ranks 
an item 2nd, then his rating for that item should have no other items 
higher except the item ranked 18t. If there are items notchosen as 1st or 
2nd choices which are rated higher than the ratings of the iterns chosen 
as 1st or 2nd, then there is an inconsistency between the subject's 
rankings and ratings due to careless responding, random checking, mis-
understanding of instructions, changing one's mind about an item, etc. 
In short, inconsistency raises questions about the reliability of the 
subject'.s entire protocol, although a little inconsistency night be 
tolerated. As a rule of thumb, look at the inconsistencies in a sub-
ject.' a first and second ranks and discard a subject's whole protocol 
if there are inconsistencies on more than 2 stories, or if the number 
of inconsistencies on any story exceeds 8 instances. (See Panowitsch, 
1974, for a study of the Consistency Check.). Also, if a subject 
shows little discrimination in his ratings {for instance, rates every 
item as "some importance") there is the suspicion that he.may not be 
takin~ the test seriously. As a rule of thumb, discard a protocol if 
two stories have more than 9 items rated the same. 
Stage !ypinq 
In research to-date on the D.I.T., the P score has been the most 
useful way to index development. In other words, if you want to 
correlate moral judgment with another variable, use the P score. If 
you want to measure change, use t.'1.e P score. It is possible, however, 
to assign subjects to a stage based on exceptional usage of that stage. 
(See Section 4 for further discussion.) The procedure is ds follows: 
1. Take the Stage totals from the DATA SHEET totals (the bottom 
line totals). 
OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROnT.EMS 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about social 
problems. Different people often have different opinions about questions of right 
and wrong. There are no "right" answers in the way that ther" are riyht answers to 
math problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about several problem 
stories. The papers will be fed lo a computer to find the average for the whole group, 
and no one will see your individual answers. 
Please give us the following information: 
Name female 
Age Class and period 
* • • * * • * 
In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about several 
stories. Here is a story as an example. 
male 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small 
children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. 
It will be used rrostly to get to work arid drive around town, but sometimes for va-
cation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that 
there were a lot of questions to consider. Below there is a list of some of these 
questions. 
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in decid-
ing what car to buy? 
Instructions for Part A: (Sample Question) 
On the left hand side check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration. 
(For instance, if you think that statement #1 is not important in ;naking a decision 
about buying a car, check the space on the right.) 
·IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1 • Whether the car dealer was in the same block as 
./ where Frank lives. (Note that in this sample, 
the person taking the questionnaire did not think 
this was important in making a decision.) 
2. Would a ~ car be ·more economical in the long 
run than a new car. (Note that a check was put in 
I the far left'"Space to indicate the opinion that 
this is an important·issue in making a decision 
about buvinq a car.) 
./ 3. Whether the color was qreen, Frank's fa.vori te co lo 
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement wus at least 
./ 200. (Note that if you are unsure about whut 
"cubic inch displacement" means, then mark it "no 
imoortance. ") 
j 5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car. 
6. Whether the front connibilies were differential. 
I (Note that if a statement sounds like gibberish or 
nonsense to YOU mark it "no importance.") 
Instructions for Part B: (Sample Question) 
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group. 
Put the number of the m::>st important question on the top line below. Do likewise for 
your 2nd, 3rd and 4th most important choices. (Note that the.top choices in this case 
will come from the statements that were checked on the far left-hand side--statements 
82 and #5 were thought to be very in:portant. In deciding what is the most important, 
a person would re-read #2 and #5, and then plck one of them as the most important, then 
put the other one as "second most important," and so on.) 
r. 
SECOND MOST IMPORTANT THIRD MOST IMPORTANT FOURTH MOST IMPORTJ\NT 
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HEINZ hND TllE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer·. There was on<' 
drug tha.t the doctors thoug<it miqht fillVe h,•r. It wao a forM of radium t.hat a dru<Jqiet. 
in the saltl9 town had recently dir;coverl'd. 'J'he drug was expensive to 11\dke, but tl1e 
druggist was charging ten times what the druq cost to tnake, He paid $200 for the 
radiWll and charged $2000 for a small dor,., of the drug. The sick "'Oman's husban·L Heinz, 
went to everyone he knew to borrow the trDn<cy, but he could only get together about 
$1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, 
and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I 
discovered the drug and I'm <;oing to make roney from it." so Heinz got desperate and 
began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal t.he drug for his >.•ifc. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one) 
~~~~ Should steal it ~~~~-can't decide Should not steal it 
IMPOR'J.'ANCE: 
"'""at Much Some Little No 
L Whether a COl!'ll!\Unity' '~.S-~2?..!_~~~~'ld,_ 
2. Isn't it only natut:a~ for a J (JViTa·j husb,,nd to care 
so much for his wife that he'd steal? 
3. Is Hc-inz willing to ri~k9~r.i;;g~~ot as a bui glal: 
or going to jail for the chance that stealing the 
drug might help? 
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has 
considerable inflU<~ncc with orofess.1 rn:a.l wreslL•,rF. 
5. l'll1ether Heinz is st,,alin:, ior hius~lf or tioing thi& 
solelv to help someone else. 
6. Whether the d..~ggist's rights to his invention have 
to be res,eected. 
7. Whether the essence of living is more enco~assing 
than the termination of dying, socially and indi-
viduallv. 
a. What values are going to be the basis for governing 
how people act towards each other. 
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide 
behind a worthless law which only protects the rich 
anvhaw. - 10. Whether the l<>w ll" this case is getting in the way 
of the most bal!ic claim of any member of societ;t:. 
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for bein g 
so qreeclv and cruel. ' 
12. Would stealing in such a case bring c.bout more to ta 1 
aood for the whole society or not. 
From the list of questions above, select the four l!OSt important: 
Most important 
Second Most Important 
Third Most Important 




At Harvard University a group of students, called the St.uc-'•:1ts for a Deoocratic 
Society (SOS), believe that the University should not have an anny FOTC program. SDS 
students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the army training proqram helps send 
men to fight in Viet Nam. The SDS students del!'anded that Harvard end the army ROTC 
training program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could 
not get army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for it 
towards their degrC?es. 
Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard p:rofossors voted to end the ROTC pro-
gram as a university course!. But the Pre~ident of the University stated that he 
wanted to ke!!p the army program on campus as a course. The SOS student,; felt that the 
President was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to th~ir demands. 
So, one day last April, two hundl'.ed SDS students walked into the univ0rsi ty 's 
administration building, and told everyone else to get out. 'l'hcy said they were doing 
this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course. 
Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check one) 
~Yes, they should take it over~- Can't decide ~~No, they shouldn't take it over 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Are the students doing this to really help other 
people or are thel:'. doin51 it just for kicks? 
2. Do the students have any right to take over prop-
erty that doesn't belong to them? 
3. Do the students realize that they might be arreste 
and fined, and even eXPelled from school? 
4. Would taking over t.he building in the long run 
benefit more people to a qrcater extent? 
s. Whether the president stayed wi thi.n the limits of 
his authority in ignoring the faculty vote. 
6. Will the takeover anger_ the public and give all 
students n bad name? 
d 
7. Is taking ov"r a building consistent with principi es 
of ;ustice? 
a. Would allowing one student take-over encourage man y 
other student take-ove1s? 
9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on 
himself bv being so unreasonable ? and uncooperative. 
10. Whether running the university ought to be in the 
hands of a few administrators or in the hands of 
all the people. 
11. Are the students following principles which they 
believe are above the law? 
12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be 
respected bv students. 
From the list of questions above, select the four ITOSt important: 
Most Important 
Second Most Important __ _ 
Third Most I1!portant 




A man hnd been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he 
escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of 
'nlompson. For 8 years he worked nard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy 
his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, ·and 
gave llPSt of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, 
recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the 
police had ~een looking for. 
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thonpson to the police and have him sent back to prison? 
(Check one) 
Should report him can't decide Should not report him 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. Hasn t Mr. Thompson been good enough f h or sue a 
lonq time to ,erove he isn't a bad Eerson? 
2. Everytime someone escapes punishr:ient for a crime, 
doesn't that iust encoura2e more crime? 
3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the 
oooression of our legal systems? 
4. !las Mr. Thon:oson really paid his debt t•.J societv? 
s. Would society be failing what Mr. ThoITpson should 
fairlv eXPect? 
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, 
es0ecially for a charitable man? ---
7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to 
send Mr. Thom12son to crison? 
a. Would it be fair to all the p:dsoners who had to 
serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was 
let off? --
9. Was Mrs. Jones a qood friend of Mr. Thomrson? 
10. Woul&1 1 t it be a citizen.'s duty to report an es cap ed 
criminal, reqardless of the circur.-tstances? 
11. How would the will of the people and the public ood g 
best be served? 
12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson 
or protect anvbodv? 
.. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
M:>st Important -.-.--
Second Most Important 
'l'hird Most Important 
Fourth Most Important 
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'ffiE DOCTOR'S DILEMMl1 
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about 
six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good 
dose of pain-killer like rno:r:phine would make her die sooner. She was delirious 
and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to 
give her enou<Jh l"l<'rphine to kill her. She said .she couldn't stand the pain and 
that she wa,; going to die .i,n a few months anyway. 
What should the doctor do? (Check one) 
He should give the lady an 
overdose that will make her die 









Whether the woman's family 
her the overdose or not. 
is 
Should not give 
the overdose 
in favor of giving 
Is the doctor obligated by thG same laws as 
everybody else if giving her an overdose would 
he the same as killinq her. 
Whether people would be much better off without 
society regimenting their lives and even their 
deaths. 
Whether the doctor could make it appear like an 
accident. 
Does the state have the right to force continued 
existence on those who don't want to live. 
What is the value of death prior to society's 
Perspective on personal values. 
Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's 
suffering or cares more about what society might 
think. 
8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible 
act of cooperation. 
9. Whether only God should decide when a person's 
life should end. 
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his 
own oersonal code of behavior. 
11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives 
when thev want to. 
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and 
still protect the lives of individuals who want to 
live. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most Important 
Second Most Importanu 
Third Most Important . 




Mr. Web::iter was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire 
another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics wen, hu.rJ to find. The only 
person he found who seemed to be a good rrechanic was Mr. lice, but he was Chinese. 
While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against Orientals, he was afraid 
to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers d.:.dn't like Orientals. His customers 
might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station. 
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that 
he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, 
because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic be:;ides Mr. Leeo 
What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one) 
Should have hired Mr. Lee Can't decide Should not have hired him 
IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No 
1. IX>es the owner of a business have the right to 
make; his own business deGisions 'H not? 
2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial dis-
crimination in hiring for jobs. 
l. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against 
orientals himself or whethec he means nothing 
personal in ::-efusinq the iol,. 
4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention 
to his customers' wishes would be best for his 
business. 
s. What individual differences ought to be relevant 
in deciding how society's roles are filled? 
6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic 
svstem ouaht to be completely abandoned. 
7. Do a ITl<<jority of people in Mr. Webster's society 
feel like his customers or are a majority against 
preiudice? 
8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use 
talents that would otherwise be lost to societv. 
9. Would refusing the job to l'.r. Lee be consistent 
with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs? 
10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse 
the iob, knowina how much it means to Mr. Lee? 
11. Whether the Christian corrunandmen t to love your 
fellow man aEolies in this case. 
12. If someone 1 s in need, shouldn't he be helped regard-
less of what you qet back from him? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most Important 
Second Most Important 
Third Most Important 
Fourth Most Important 
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APPENDIX C 




I got your name from your introductory psychology class. I'm 
conducting a psychological experiment and am calling to ask if you'd be 
interested in being a subject. As you know, you will receive extra 
credit for participation and this study will involve about 30 minutes 
of your time. 
Let me tell you briefly what the study is about. We're interested 
in physiological reactions to sexual stimuli. Before you agree to 
participate you should know that the sexual stimuli we are using consist 
of slides of semi-nude females. Essentially, we will be monitoring your 
heart rate with small electrodes taped to your forearm as you view 
slides of semi-nude females. Do you have any questions? 
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Experimenter's Instructions for Questionnaire 
Hello. My name is Before I run you in the experiment, 
there is a brief questionnaire I need you to fill out. The question-
naire is self-explanatory and I'd like you to try to answer all of the 
questions. Of course, you are free to leave any question blank. The 
information will remain confidential and your name will be blacked out 
once your data is collected. 
(Experimenter leads subject to waiting room with "Do Not Disturb" 
sign.) 
I guess this room is being used for another experiment. 
(Experimenter leads subject to another room.) 
I think it will be o.k. to put you in here. Would it disturb you 
if my subject filled out this questionnaire in here? I'll be back in 
about ten minutes to run you. Please wait here for me. 
1. Name: 






3. Age (to nearest year): 




5. Number of Children: 
6. Number of Siblings: 





8. Size of town where raised: 
Rural area 
Less than 5,000 
5' 000-10, 000 
10,000-50,000 
More than 50,000 
9. Education of Mother: 
Graduate Degree 
College Graduate 
More than one year of college 
Highschool graduate 
Did not complete highschool 
10. Education of Father 
Graduate Degree 
College Graduate 
More than one year of college 
Highschool graduate 
Did not complete highschool 
11. Mother's Occupation: 
12. Father's Occupation: 
85 
13. Dominant Religion of Family During Childhood: 
Nonreligious belief, atheist, or agnostic 
Unitarian, Quaker 
Protestant (Fundamentalist, Baptist, Pentecostal, etc.) 




14. Church Attendance as a Child 
Never 
Occasionally (special holidays, etc.) 
Bimonthly 
Weekly 
More than once a week 
15. Current Religious Beliefs: 
Nonreligious belief, atheist, or agnostic 
Unitarian, Quaker 
Protestant (Fundamentalist, Baptist, Pentecostal, etc.) 




16. Current Church Attendance: 
Never 
Occasionally (special holidays, etc.) 
Bimonthly 
Weekly 
More than once a week 
86 
87 
Experimenter's Instructions for Valins Procedure 
I will be taping these electrodes to your forearms. They pick up 
each major hear.t sound which is amplified here and initiates a signal 
on this signal tracer. The signal is then recorded on this tape 
recorder. By appropriately using a stop watch and footage indicator, I 
can later determine exactly where each stimulus occurred and evaluate 
your heart rate reaction to it. Unfortunately, this recording method 
makes it necessary to have audible sounds. There would be a serious 
problem if we were employing a task which required concentration. Since 
our procedure does not require concentration, it won't be too much of a 
problem and it is not likely to affect the results. All that you will 
be required to do is sit here and look at the slides. Just try to 
ignore the heart sounds. I will tape these electrodes to your arms and 
after recording your resting heart rate for awhile, I will present 12 
slides to you at regular intervals. Then I will record your resting 
heart rate again for several minutes and I will repeat the same slides 
again in the same order. 
APPENDIX D 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURES 
88 
89 
Experimenter's Comments for Picture Rating 
I'm asking all subjects to rate the slides as to how attractive or 
appealing they were so that I can select a smaller number of the more 
attractive slides for future research. Using this Picture Attractive-
ness Scale, please rate each picture as I show them to you again very 
quickly. Circle the number indicating your attractiveness rating, zero 
being not at all attractive to 100 being extremely attractive. 
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PICTURE ATTRACTIVENESS SCALE 
1. 
0 5 10 lS 20 25 30 3S 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Not at all attractive Extremely attractive 
2. 
0 5 10 15 20 2S 30 35 40 45 SO SS 60 6S 70 75 80 8S 90 95 100 
Not at all attractive Extremely attractive 
3. 
0 5 10 15 20 2S 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 6S 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Not at all attractive Extremely attractive 
4. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 3S 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Not at all attractive Extremely attractive 
5. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Not at all attractive Extremely attractive 
6. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Not at all attractive Extremely attractive 
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Pact of Ignorance Set 
Before you go, I'd like to get some of your reactions to the exper-
iment you were just in. This experiment is part of my doctoral disser-
tation and I'm trying to get the data collected before the end of the 
semester. This late in the semester, it's pretty hard to get subjects, 
you know, so I want to really thank you for participating. Well, let 
me ask you a few questions about your reactions to the experiment. 
Scientific Integrity Set 
I want to thank you for your participation in this experiment. 
Before you go, however, I'd like to ask you a few questions about your 
reactions to the experiment you were just in. The idea of this inter-
view is to make sure we know if any kinds of possible irregularities in 
the procedure have taken place. These kind of things sometimes do 
happen. As long as we know about them, we can correct for it, and thus 
insure that our findings are valid and reliable--that's extremely impor-
tant for the scientific validity of the experiment. O.K.? Well, let me 
ask you a few questions about your reaction to the experiment. 
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INTERVIEW 
1. Have you ever read of any experiments like this one? 
2. Have experiments like this one ever been discussed or described in 
your lectures, classes or lab work? 
3. I had asked you to try to ignore the heart sounds. Did you have 
any trouble doing this during the experiment? 
4. Did you notice anything about the rate of the heart sounds during 
the experiment? 
5. Were you aware of any relationship between the heart beats and the 
attractiveness of the pictures? 
6. Did the heart sounds seem to you to accurately reflect your reac-
tion to the slides? (probe "Why" if S says No) 
7. As far as you could tell, what do you think the connection was 
between the pictures and your heart rate? (probe if "no connect.") 
8. Do you have any hunches about what the purpose of this experiment 
was? (probe if S says he was deceived) 
9. Did you think there was any deception involved in the experiment? 
Were you fooled in any way? (If yes question about details) eg. 
"Why?" 
10. Did you ever have the idea that the heart sounds might not be your 
own? (probe "Why" if S says yes) 
11. Did you hear anything about the experiment from anyone who had been 
a subject earlier? (Probe if S says yes) 
12. (If vague or No to question 11) Sometimes people do talk about the 
experiment and it's not really anybody's fault ••• so don't hesi-
tate to tell us if some information leaked out. 
Confession = Subject must mention that confederate told him his heart 
beats were phony/try to make him rate some pictures as more 
attractive because the heart rate increases. 
Discontinue interview if subject confesses. Thank him, etc. 
If subject says he did not think heart sounds were his own (eg. on 
questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9) make a single probe or "Why?" Make 
sure that the probe is brief. Do not make more than one probe per 
question. 
Record subjects' responses as accurately as possible, noting any irreg-
ularities, etc. Sign your name to his protocol sheet. 
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INTERVIEW RATING SHEET 
1. no 



















































_ yes--PROBE (eg. what) 
confession 
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12. _ nothing 
confession 
Experimenter: 
Condition: PI or SI (circle one) 
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Interview Scoring 
Confession • subject must mention that the confederate told him that 
his heart beats were phony/try to make him rate some pic-
tures as attractive because the heart rate increases. 
1. 0 no 9. 0 = no 
1 maybe (vague) 1 = vague-guess 
2 ... yes 2 = more specific 
70 = total confession 3 = not mine (PROBE) 
40 = total confession 
2. 0 no 
1 = maybe (vague) 10. 0 = no 
2 = yes 1 = not sure 
67 = total confession 2 = yes (PROBE) 
36 = total confession 
3. 0 = no 
1 little 11. 0 no 
2 yes 1 = not sure 
3 = not mine (PROBE) 2 = yes (PROBE) 
64 = total confession 33 = total confession 
4. 0 = no 12. 0 = nothing 
1 = changed (vague) 30 total confession 
2 = faster-pictures 
3 = not mine (PROBE) 
60 = total confession 
5. 0 = no 
1 vague 
2 = yes-faster 
3 - not mine (PROBE) 
56 = total confession 
6. 0 = yes 
1 = some slides 
2 = not sure (vague) 
3 = no-not mine (PROBE) 
52 = total confession 
7. 0 don't know 
1 = vague 
2 faster-pictures 
3 not mine-no connection (PROBE) 
48 = total confession 
8. 0 - no 
1 vague 
2 faster-pictures 
3 = deception (PROBE) 






SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
Students in Introductory Psychology classes were administered 
Rest's Defining Issues Test of moral judgment. Only male protocols were 
scored and each subject was assigned a stage score of moral development. 
An equal number of subjects were randomly chosen from each of the three 
levels of moral development. These subjects were contacted by phone and 
asked to participate in an experiment on psysiological reactions to 
sexually oriented stimuli. No relation between the pretesting and 
participation in the experiment was made. 
When the subject arrived he filled out a questionnaire. Because 
the designated waiting room was locked and "accidentally" in use E has 
to put s in a room where a subject (really our confederate) from another 
experiment was working. One of the difficulties of doing research in 
psychology is that subjects often tell others what the experiment is 
about. When the experimenter asks them if they have ever heard anythjng 
about the experiment most subjects say "no" because they don't want to 
invalidate their data, get anyone in trouble or make things difficult 
for the experimenter. We had the confederate tell you what our exper-
iment was about so that we could study this situation. After viewing 
the slides subjects were administered a post-experimental interview to 
which they were assigned to one of two conditions. In one condition, 
the Pact of Ignorance (PI), the experimenter hinted that he needs the 
subject's data and doesn't really want to know if the subject has ille-
gitimate information. In the Scientific Integrity (SI) condition the 
experimenter stressed the importance of valid data and tried to encour-
age the subject to be truthful. Thus, using a more complex kind of 
questionnaire than has been used before we were trying to see if we 
could influence subjects to be more open with us regarding their know-
ledge of the experimental procedures. We were also looking at the 
relationship between being open (confession) and level of moral develop-
ment. 
RESULTS 
None of the experimental hypotheses were supported. Neither level 
of moral development nor type of interview (PI or SI) influenced how 
open subjects were regarding their knowledge of the procedures. Only 
about 20% of the subjects told the experimenter of his conversation with 
the confederate and these subjects were distributed across all condi-
tions. 
Your participation in this study was greatly appreciated. The 
data is in code form and the names have been destroyed to insure confi-
dentiality. If you have further questions about this study please feel 
free to stop by my office. I am there on Tuesday from 10:00 a.m. to 
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